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ABSTRACT
Aviation is a vital component of the State of Alaska’s transportation system. Air transportation is
frequently the only means to move goods, services, and people across the state. Historically, air
taxi and non-scheduled/charter air operators (14 C.F.R. Part 135) form the bulk of service
providers in Alaska and have poor operational safety records through high rates of accidents. The
problem is still prevalent despite numerous initiatives by the Federal Aviation Administration to
reduce adverse safety events. Accident investigation reports have nominally attributed causal
factors of these accidents to pilot error and at-risk behaviors such as violations. Extant research
in aviation human factors suggest that optimal aeronautical decision-making (ADM) by pilots is
essential for safe flight outcomes. There seems to be a paucity in literature that qualitatively
explores factors influencing effective ADM of Part 135 pilots who fly in this operationally
challenged region. Documentary analysis of accident case studies and semi-structured interviews
with a convenience sample of Part 135 pilots with varying experiences flying in Alaska were
conducted. Thematic analysis was used to extract salient themes that throw light on the problem
statement. Findings suggest that mentorship, camaraderie, and positive relationships with senior
management are essential for optimal ADM by these pilots, which auger well for operational
safety. Investments in proactive organizational safety initiatives and improvements in aviation
technology infrastructure were also highlighted by respondents as key to effective ADM. The
study provides in-depth understanding of Part 135 pilot ADM during flight operations and helps
to frame policies and practices for safer operations in Alaska.

xii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Rationale for the Study
Alaska is a state in the western United States, on the northwest extremity of the country’s
west coast. A semi-exclave of the United States, it borders the Canadian provinces of British
Columbia and Yukon to the east and has a maritime border with Russia across the Bering Strait
(State of Alaska, n.d.). More than half of Alaska’s population lives in three cities (i.e.,
Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau) and over 86% of Alaskan communities are not connected to
the road system (“Alaska Mapping,” 2017, p. 48). Accessibility to many of these communities is
via air transport modals. Of them, approximately 60 are part of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (2021) essential air service program, which subsidizes air service to small
communities. Air transportation significantly contributes to the Alaskan economy. The total
economic contribution of aviation in Alaska is $3.8 billion. Rural airports and air transport
contribute approximately $1.5 billion of that sum (Alaska Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities, 2019). A map of Alaska is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Map of Alaska Showing Regions and Road System

Note. From “Alaska Map,” by Travel Alaska, n.d. (https://www.travelalaska.com/GettingAround/Alaska-Map.aspx).

Most of the air transport service providers are air taxi and small non-scheduled charter
(i.e., on-demand) operators (C.F.R. Part 135) who facilitate the movement of goods and
passengers for these communities and also provide services like medical evacuation (medevac)
and search and rescue (Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, 2018; “Alaska
Mapping,” 2017, p. 53). Part 135 applications like air tourism, hunting expeditions, aerial
mapping, and humanitarian missions are also common (Alaska.org, n.d.). The flexibility of Part
135 certification allows large and small operators to coexist under the same regulations.
Part 135 operators can be certified to fly on-demand operations, which allow aircraft to
operate with up to 30 seats and limited scheduled services. They can also be certified as
commuter operations, which entails scheduled services in aircraft with nine seats or fewer. The
scope of Part 135 operators varies. Organizations can be certified as single-pilot, where only one
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pilot is on the operating certificate and the requirements for training manuals and departments
are small, to Standard Part 135 operations, where there are no limits on the size and scope of an
operation, but certain standards for training and management positions exist (Operating
Requirements, 2020).
Despite the enormous socioeconomic contributions of these operators, the hazards and
safety risks posed to aviation operations are amplified by the geography of the state, which
features extreme weather and rugged terrain (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2017,
2021b). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has identified the leading accident
types in Alaska as controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and loss of control in flight due to pilots
certified to operate under visual flight rules (VFR) inadvertently or intentionally flying in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) as leading accident types in Alaska (Sumwalt,
2019). The FAA defined controlled flight into terrain as the impact of an airworthy aircraft with
terrain, usually due to inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot (FAA, 2003). VFR into IMC
refers to continued visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions; in many cases, CFIT
is the end result (FAA, 2003).
A sparse number of weather reporting systems is located over a wide expanse of land and
the limited number of technologically advanced ground-based navigational aids for aviation
increases the accident potential for air operators (FAA, 2021b). Historically, the aviation safety
record among these Part 135 operators and general aviators in Alaska has not been the best as
compared to the rest of the United States.
The NTSB (2021) aviation accident database and a National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (2018) study suggested that, between 1990 and 2015, 36% of the 1,874
commuter and air taxi accidents in the United States occurred in Alaska. Alaska accounted for
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over 20% of these accidents that were fatal. Figure 2 shows common ground-based weather
observation stations in Alaska. Figures 3 and 4 show the accident rates of the United States and
Alaska per 100,000 flight hours.

Figure 2
Common Ground-Based Weather Observation Systems in Alaska

Note. From “LIVE: FAA’s Alaska Aviation Safety Summit [Video],” by the Federal Aviation
Administration, 2020, YouTube, 02:10:24 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZqA5uvA_3A).
(FAA, 2020d).
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Figure 3
U.S. Accident Rate of General Aviation and Part 135 Operations in 2019

Note. From “LIVE: FAA’s Alaska Aviation Safety Summit [Video],” by the Federal Aviation
Administration, 2020, YouTube, 01:26:06 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZqA5uvA_3A).
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Figure 4
Alaska Accident Rate of General Aviation and Part 135 Operations in 2019

Note. From “LIVE: FAA’s Alaska Aviation Safety Summit [Video],” by the Federal Aviation
Administration, 2020, YouTube, 01:26:27 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ZqA5uvA_3A).

The high accident rate in Alaska has encouraged organizations like the CDC, FAA, and
independent researchers to explore accident causal and contributory factors among Part 135
pilots in Alaska. The majority of this research has used accident or survey data (Conway et al.,
2004, 2005, 2006; FAA, 2021b; Mode et al., 2012; Williams, 2011). Fewer have taken a
qualitative approach through the use of pilot interviews, and there seems to be a paucity of
current qualitative research focused on understanding the causal and contributory factors of these
aviation accidents from the perspectives of pilots operating in Alaska.

6

Eliciting the views of these key stakeholders through interviews may yield vital
intelligence required for effective mitigation of this operational safety problem. Other
contributory and less explored safety challenges, such as human factors and performance factors
related to ineffective aeronautical decision-making (ADM) require deeper understanding using a
qualitative research approach, since these factors can increase the accident potential of pilots
(Williams, 2011).
Remote Aviation Operations (Bush Flying)
Operations that take place in isolated or inhospitable locations, or areas where air service
is sparse, are known as bush flying (Johnston, 2021). In the United States, Alaska is perhaps the
best example of where bush flying normally occurs due to its remoteness, geography, and
population. Michalski and Bearman (2014) suggested other areas where bush flying activities are
common, including Outback Australia, the tundra of Canada, the rainforests of South America,
and tropical forest areas of Africa.
Alaska, the focus of this study, has an area of over 560,000 sq mi and a vast amount of
geographical diversity (State of Alaska, n.d.). Southeast Alaska is well known for rainy
instrument flight rules (IFR) weather year-round and is part of the largest temperate rainforest in
the world. Geographical features augment the challenge of flying in this region, where fjords,
narrow channels, and mountains combine with unpredictable coastal weather. Figure 5 shows
potential bush areas in Africa and Australia. Figure 6 shows similar areas in Canada and South
America.
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Figure 5
Tropical Forest Areas of Africa and Outback Australia

Note. From “The Congo Rainforest,” by R. A. Butler, 2020, Mongabay
(https://rainforests.mongabay.com/congo/). From “Outback Australia – The Rangelands,” by the
Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment, 2005
(https://www.awe.gov.au/agriculture-land/land/rangelands).
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Figure 6
Rainforests of South America and Canadian Tundra and Forest Areas

Note. From “Map of Amazon Planned for National Geographic Magazine,” by the Amazon
Biodiversity Center, 2014 (https://www.amazonbiodiversitycenter.org/singlepost/2014/10/02/map-of-amazon-planned-for-national-geographic-magazine). From “Subarctic
America,” by One Earth, n.d. (https://www.oneearth.org/realms/subarctic-america/).

The Aleutian Island chain is known for rapidly changing weather and challenging airports
along its miles of volcanic coastline. Alaska also has vast tundra, mountainous terrain, coastal
weather, and extreme temperatures (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2016). It
is only possible to travel between many communities by boat or plane, and it is worth noting that
the capitol of Alaska, Juneau, is only accessible in this way (Alaska Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities, n.d.a). These features present unique hazards uncommon in
other parts of the United States. Figure 7 shows common terrain features in Alaska.
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Figure 7
Common Terrain Features in Alaska

Note. Clockwise from left: tundra, mountain airport, coastal terrain, mountain pass. From
“Collage of Alaska Terrain,” by D. J. Atkins, 2018. Copyright 2018 by Dana Atkins.

The majority (over 85%) of aircraft used for bush flying in air taxi or commuter
companies are single-engine aircraft (Conway et al., 2004; FAA, 2021a). The Cessna 208
Caravan, Cessna 207, de Havilland Beaver, and Piper Super-Cub are popular among operators
(Johnston, 2021). Their multi-engine counterparts consist of aircraft like the Piper Navajo and
the Beechcraft 1900 due to their ruggedness and suitability for Alaskan terrain. While aircraft
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can be kept on wheels year-round, some choose to fly floats or skis seasonally, which requires a
specific skill base for their pilots and an additional challenge to maintain proficiency (FAA,
2004). Aircraft are often modified to withstand harsh airport environments; many are equipped
with larger tires, reinforced landing gear, and have been certified to operate at high-gross weights
(Johnston, 2021). Figure 8 shows examples of popular aircraft used in the bush.
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Figure 8
Popular Bush Aircraft

Note. Clockwise from left: Cessna 208 Caravan, de Havilland DHC-3 Beaver, Cessna 207, Piper
PA-18 SuperCub. From “Super Cub for Sale,” by CubCrafters, 2021
(http://cubcrafters.com/c/inventory/n4293z-180-hp-alaska-mod-super-cub-w-external-loadapproval/). From “Our Fleet,” by Ryan Air, n.d. (https://ryanalaska.com/fleet/). From “Airwaves
Gold Coast VH-IDO de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver Mk1 c/n 1545 [Photograph],” by R.
Frola, 2013, Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:VHIDO_De_Havilland_Canada_DHC-2_Beaver_Mk1_Airwaves_Gold_Coast_(8402101541).jpg
#filelinks).
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History of Bush Flying
The influential role of aviation cannot be underestimated in recalling the history of the
State of Alaska. Early pioneers of flying in Alaska were often referred to as bush pilots, and their
resilience and will to surmount the daunting challenges of extreme environments made them an
enduring symbol of Alaskan aviation. These bush pilots have carved a niche for themselves in
vividly creating imagery of Alaska as the “last frontier,” which provided a strategic business
incentive to promote tourism dating back to the end of World War II (Ringsmuth, 2015, p. 7).
Historically, the evolution of aviation in Alaska can be compared to the American West,
which had imagery of cowboys, gunfights, barren deserts, and tall tales (Ringsmuth, 2015). That
is due to the early environmental and operational challenges enumerated earlier in this study,
which required tenacity to overcome. In an FAA-sponsored history of the evolution of aviation
in Alaska, Kraus (2020) described how the advent of the aircraft and its explosive popularity in
Alaska transformed the state from final frontier to strategic powerhouse in business and politics.
The introduction of the aircraft as a transportation modal in Alaska also created
accessibility to vast areas rich in mineral resources and biodiversity. Aviation played a vital role
in the early exploration of gold and oil, which paved the way for infrastructure development in
Alaska (Ringsmuth, 2014). The geographic position of the state, especially the city of
Anchorage, made it an aviation hub for trans-Pacific commerce and freight (Phillips, 2016).
Alaska also had strategic military aviation capabilities due to its proximity to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and China during the height of the Cold War (Cloe, 2015). The frontier phase
of Alaska’s aviation story never truly ended, enduring today despite the commercialization of
aviation after World War II (Ringsmuth, 2015).
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Alaska Safety Initiatives
In the 1990s, the aviation accident rate in Alaska was nearly five times the rate in the rest
of the United States. Due to this high figure, in 2000, the U.S. Congress started a program to
address flight safety called the Alaska Interagency Aviation Safety Initiative (Berman et al.,
2005). The program was apportioned approximately $800,000 of federal funds per year to meet
objectives to lower the accident rate by 50% between 2000 and 2009 (Berman et al., 2005). The
Alaska Interagency Aviation Safety Initiative made recommendations that initiated or enhanced
new and existing programs, such as the Capstone program and the Medallion Foundation.
The Capstone program was developed in 1999 and was initially provided with $11
million in federal funds to improve safety through the use of Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast systems (ADS-B; FAA, 2020a; University of Alaska Anchorage [UAA], 2005). ADSB technology uses on-board aircraft systems to broadcast flight data like position and
groundspeed to other airborne systems or to ground-based receivers. This helps with traffic
conflicts and congestion, and today it is part of the FAA’s NextGen Air Transportation System
(FAA, 2020b). It was envisaged that the Capstone program would meet four operational goals:
(a) reduce CFIT accidents, (b) reduce traffic conflicts and accidents, (c) enhance flight weather
information, and (d) address shortcomings in the IFR infrastructure (UAA, 2005).
The FAA and State of Alaska portioned Capstone funds to Alaskan operators
participating in the program to install enhanced avionics capable of ADS-B in their aircraft
(FAA, 2020a). The program was so successful in its first phase in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta,
an area in western Alaska bordered to the north by the Yukon River and to the south by the
Kuskokwim River, that it was later expanded to Southeast Alaska in Phase II, the panhandle on
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the southeast portion of the state bordered to the east by British Columbia, Canada, and to the
west by the Gulf of Alaska (FAA, 2020a; UAA, 2005, 2006).
Legacy Capstone technology is still used by operators today; however, improper training
on its use and outdated database equipment were contributory factors in a recent fatal accident.
In 2019, two aircraft collided midair in a popular tour location near Ketchikan, Alaska, after a
failure to properly use ADS-B equipment, among other factors (NTSB, 2021a). Figure 9 shows
the implementation areas of the Capstone Program, and Figure 10 shows ADS-B equipment
installed in an aircraft.

15

Figure 9
The Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta and Southeast Alaska Regions of the Capstone Program

Note. From “The Impact of Capstone Phase 1 Program: Final Report,” by the University of
Alaska Anchorage, 2005, p. i (https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs/adsb/Archival/
media/Phase%201%20Final%20with%20appendices.pdf). From “Capstone Phase II
Implementation Progress Annual Report, 2005,” by the University of Alaska Anchorage, 2006,
p. i (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1107038.pdf).
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Figure 10
ADS-B Capable Equipment Installed in an Aircraft Panel

Note. From “Next Generation Navigation in Alaska – Capstone Program,” by the Alaska
Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, n.d.
(https://dot.alaska.gov/stwdav/Capstone.shtml).

In 1999, the FAA developed a separate initiative to install live webcams at strategic
locations across the State of Alaska to provide real-time weather footage to pilots for flightplanning purposes. The FAA Weather Camera Project consists of 230 cameras installed between
1999 and 2016 (FAA, 2020a). The cameras were implemented to increase safety across the state
and are used by recreational and professional pilots alike. As recently as 2020, states in the
contiguous United States and Hawaii appropriated funds to begin or augment their own weather
camera projects in conjunction with the FAA (2020a). Figures 11 and 12 show weather camera
footage and weather camera locations in Alaska.
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Figure 11
FAA Weather Camera Footage

Note. From “WeatherCams,” by the Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.
(https://weathercams.faa.gov/map/-162.04186,57.22319,-128.29186,64.52294).
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Figure 12
FAA Weather Camera Map, Alaska

Note. From “WeatherCams,” by the Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.
(https://weathercams.faa.gov/map/-162.04186,57.22319,-128.29186,64.52294).

The Medallion Foundation, formed in 2001 and recently defunded in 2019, was
established to reduce aviation accidents and bolster safety in Alaska (Berman et al., 2005). The
foundation provided organizational tools for procedural training and developed a Shield program
to award operators for participation in their programs. Receiving the Medallion Shield would
give operators financial cost-saving incentives like reductions in insurance costs (Berman et al.,
2005). The program consisted of five elements: (a) safety management system (SMS) and safety
program implementation, (b) training and checking, (c) operational risk management and risk
assessment, (d) maintenance and ground personnel training, and (e) an internal audit system
(Alaska Aviation, 2005). Components of these elements included CFIT awareness training and
risk assessment matrices and development, among others.
19

The Medallion Foundation initially received $3 million in FAA funding, followed by
$1.5 million in 2002, and $1 million in subsequent years (Kraus, 2020). Participation in the
Shield program was voluntary and provided operators free resources to meet the program
objectives. Additional Medallion resources included free simulators for pilots to practice their
skills using reference to flight instruments (Kraus, 2020).
The Medallion Foundation has been under scrutiny by investigative journalists since its
closure due to the continued high accident record among Shield carriers, inadequate Medallion
oversight of participating carriers, and the FAA’s oversight of the program (Hollander & McGee,
2019; Mondor, 2021). NTSB investigations have listed inadequate oversight of Medallion
programs as contributory causes to accidents, yet this is countered by representatives that say the
Foundation had no regulatory powers (Kraus, 2020; NTSB, 2018). Despite these challenges,
operators in Alaska have enumerated the benefits of the Medallion Foundation and are hopeful
that a similar organization will take its place (FAA, 2021b).
Despite positive gains from the FAA Capstone Project, the Weather Camera Project, and
the Medallion Foundation, the rates of accidents and incidents in Alaska remain high. A NTSB
(2020) safety recommendation report found that, between 2008 and 2017, Alaska had an
accident rate 2.35 times higher than the rest of the United States. Aviation safety in Alaska was
recently the subject of an NTSB (2019a) roundtable to address these concerns and issue
recommendations for flight safety improvement.
In broader terms, Part 135 safety was on the NTSB Most Wanted List for the year 2019–
2020 (NTSB, 2019b). The current Most Wanted List for 2021–2022 also addressed Part 135
operations and recommended that SMSs become required for all revenue passenger carrying
operations (NTSB, 2021d). SMSs are an organization-wide approach to managing risk. They
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implement organization controls and address four areas: safety policy, risk management,
assurance, and promotion (FAA, 2016a).
In October 2021, the FAA released the final report on the FAA Alaska Aviation Safety
Initiative (FAA, 2021b). The report was a multi-year, interdisciplinary study in response to
NTSB roundtable recommendations to improve aviation safety in Alaska (NTSB, 2019a). The
report used comments from organization and individual stakeholders to document the safety
challenges facing Part 91 and Part 135 operators in Alaska (FAA, 2021b). The report categorized
those challenges into four groups and addressed current and proposed programs aimed at their
resolution.
The first category of the FAA Alaska Aviation Safety Initiative report focused on the
environment. It discussed weather and terrain challenges that are a natural part of flying in
Alaska. Stakeholders emphasized the lack of reliable weather reporting stations as a limiting
factor to accessing many communities (FAA, 2021b). The second category addressed issues with
the aircraft fleet, namely aging technology and the prohibitive costs to small operators associated
with upgrading avionics. Infrastructure (i.e., communications, navigation, surveillance) was the
third category.
Stakeholders described an antiquated system that is decades behind technologies used in
the remainder of the United States. Improvements to radar, surveillance technology like ADS-B,
and GPS-based route structures were named as potential mitigating strategies (FAA, 2021b).
Lastly, operations safety management, which included a focus on pilot experience and training,
was discussed (FAA, 2021b). The report described several ongoing and planned programs to
address some of these issues and outlined a road map for implementation over the next decade
(FAA, 2021b).
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Problem Statement
The critical nature of air transport to the Alaskan way of life means safety incidents and
accidents have far-reaching effects on the communities of Alaska. CFIT and VFR into IMC
accidents have been endemic to aviation in Alaska (Mode et al., 2012; NTSB, 2017a; 2018). In a
study on the psychological factors affecting pilots’ decisions to fly into deteriorating weather,
authors Madhavan and Lacson (2006) suggested that causes of VFR into IMC accidents include
a variety of human fctors elements, such as situation assessment and risk perception, as well as
intrinsic and extrinsic factors like social and motivational pressures. Decisions to fly VFR into
IMC are made more dangerous due to the environment in Alaska, where weather reporting and
IFR infrastructure are limited.
In June 2015, a flightseeing tour aircraft impacted terrain near Ketchikan, Alaska, and all
passengers on board were killed (NTSB, 2017a). The NTSB investigation revealed that
inadequate decision-making and organizational culture were contributory factors to the accident
(NTSB, 2017a). The following year, in October 2016, a separate accident killed all three
occupants of an aircraft when it impacted terrain near Togiak, Alaska (NTSB, 2018). The
NTSB’s (2018) final report listed inadequate aeronautical decision-making, along with
inadequate regulatory and organizational oversight, as factors in the accident. In August 2021,
yet another fatal accident occurred in Southeast Alaska, near Ketchikan, when a flightseeing tour
impacted terrain in marginal weather conditions. The NTSB (2021b) is currently investigating
the cause.
Bearman et al. (2009) conducted a qualitative study that sought to examine both direct
and indirect operational pressures faced by pilots in Alaska. Twenty-eight Part 135 pilots were
interviewed, and the results from the study suggested that recurrent themes of organizational
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culture, organizational processes, and resource allocation influenced pilot decision-making.
Bearman et al. focused on organizational variables in their initial analysis and did not probe into
social and personal influences on decision-making among the study participants. Using the same
interview data, Bearman et al. performed a secondary analysis to understand the role of
motivations on pilot ADM. The results suggested that personal inconveniences could have
significant influence over ADM.
From a more globalized perspective, Leigh and Rissanen (2010) used qualitative research
data derived from interviews to evaluate the recruiting and training practices of pilots flying in
remote parts of Africa. Their findings suggested that most negative motivational influences were
related to environmental, behavioral, and cultural factors. Examples of these influences were the
excessive difficulties of bush flying, meeting passenger expectations, and pressure from
customers and the pilots’ organizations to break regulation. The results further reiterated that
pressures to complete flights were due to management practices and in part to the pilots’
personal self-motivations (Leigh & Rissanen, 2010).
Researchers Michalski and Bearman (2014) explored factors affecting the decisionmaking of pilots who fly in Outback Australia through the use of semi-structured interviews with
12 participants. The authors suggested that organizational, social, and personal factors have a
strong influence on pilots’ decisions to accept flights. Weak organizational culture from low
safety standards influenced pilots to make risky decisions. Personal and social influences, like
career ambition and pressures from peers and customers, were significant to the pilots’ decisionmaking (Michalski & Bearman, 2014).
The findings from qualitative studies emphasized that myriad different cultural and social
factors are influential on Part 135 pilots’ decision-making. Qualitatively, assessing and
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understanding how cultural and psychosocial factors influence ADM among Part 135 pilots
flying in Alaska can provide valuable insight for effective policies and practices to reduce
adverse operational safety events. A paucity of current qualitative-based studies related to psychsocial and cultural factors influencing ADM among this group of pilots makes this study timely
and relevant.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study is to explore the psychosocial and cultural influences on Part
135 flying in Alaska. Extant studies suggest sociocultural factors influence decision-making in
this group of pilots. Plan continuation errors are byproducts of emotion and stress that can bias
decision-making toward riskier and less rational behavior (Causse et al., 2013). When risky
behaviors are rewarded with successful outcomes, cultural norms may develop among pilot
groups (Transport Canada, 2002).
Complex situations with opaque outcomes, time pressures, and influences from cultural
norms also create obstacles toward decision-making (Strohschneider, 2002). Other factors, which
include company and peer-based influence, along with pilot attitudes and motivations, may lead
to poor decision-making during flight operations and explain factors in aviation accidents
(Causse et al., 2013; Noort et al., 2021; Strohschneider, 2002; Transport Canada, 2002).
A qualitative inquiry was chosen to explore the perspectives of pilots who fly in Alaska.
A qualitative analysis attempts to find patterns and describe their relationships through the use of
documents, images, or observed behavior (Saldaña & Omasta, 2018). It was envisaged that the
opinions of pilots relating to psychosocial and cultural factors affecting their decision-making
during flight operations can provide important feedback needed for improving safety controls
related to aviation safety in the state.
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To explore the psychosocial and cultural factors affecting bush pilots, three aviation
accident case studies and a descriptive documentary analysis of NTSB accident data from the
years 2008 to 2018 was performed. The emergent themes derived from these analyses guided the
item development for the final phase of the research which was a semi-structured interview. The
semi-structured interview was chosen to keep consistency between interview participants yet
allow each individual to respond organically.
Semi-structured interviews are valuable when exploring potentially new phenomena, as
they allow each participant to voice individual opinions (Adams, 2015). Codes and emergent
themes from the semi-structured interviews provided data which was analyzed to understand the
operational roles of these Part 135 pilots and how psychosocial and cultural factors influence
their decision-making styles. It was also envisaged that data triangulation derived from the three
approaches will provide better perspective to the discussion of results.
Central Research Question
What psychosocial and organizational factors influence decision-making of 14 C.F.R.
135 pilots in Alaska and contribute to incidents and accidents among this group of pilots?
Underlying Research Questions
1. What are the environmental and operational factors that make flight operations in
Alaska challenging for Part 135 pilots?
2. What are the organizational factors that influence decision-making among Part 135
pilots in Alaska?
3. What are the psychosocial and cultural factors that influence decision-making among
Part 135 pilots in Alaska?
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4. How do prior experiences and generational/age differences affect decision-making
during operations among Part 135 pilots in Alaska?
5. What is the perception of the safety culture among Part 135 pilots in Alaska and how
does it influence hazard identification and safety risk decisions?
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
The following literature review overviews extant literature on the operational, cultural,
and psychosocial factors that affect pilot decision-making in bush flying operations. Other
factors that adversely affect pilot decision-making in remote or bush locations are environmental
factors (type of terrain and weather) and poor aviation infrastructure. Furthermore, there are
specific psychological influences on pilots, which are discussed in the following section and
provide a framework for this study.
Hazardous Attitudes and Pilot Personality
Attitude and personality are inherently different. Personality, intrinsic traits and enduring
qualities of a person’s demeanor, is relatively stagnant due to its development during childhood
(Helmreich, 1984). There is debate in the literature on how effective personality characteristics
are at predicting pilot ability (Besco, 1994; Hunter, 2005). However, studies on pilot personality
have shown a trend in traits such as conscientiousness, achievement-striving, assertiveness, and
general emotional stability among this group (Fitzgibbons et al., 2000). People possessing these
personality traits may be drawn to the profession; however, personality is not a good determinant
of pilot ability.
Attitude is a better target for pilot training and development. Attitudes are learned
behaviors influenced by positive and negative reinforcements from the environment (Hunter,
2005). “Attitude is a motivational predisposition to respond to people, situations, or events in a
given manner,” and it is well-accepted that attitude is an influence on action and behavior (FAA,
2016b, p. 2-5). It more accurately describes common aviation pitfalls and can be mediated to
produce reductions in safety concerns (Helmreich, 1984).
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The FAA (2016b) identified five hazardous attitudes generally observed among pilots.
These are anti-authority, impulsiveness, invulnerability, macho, and resignation. Invulnerability
is the root cause of other hazardous attitudes; poor decision-making can be attributed to
invulnerability, macho, and anti-authority almost exclusively (Murray, 1999). In a review of
NTSB accident reports associated with Part 135 operations in Alaska encompassing the period
between 2008 and 2018, resignation was not an influential or contributory factor.
While the hazardous attitudes are simplistic in name, the nature of how these affect
pilots’ decision-making can be complex. Comprehensive educational materials necessary for
gaining knowledge and understanding of these hazardous attitudes are included in aviation
training at all levels from private pilot curriculum to professional airline training across the globe
(Lee & Park, 2016). This model has been so effective that it has crossed into medical and other
high-reliability fields (Reason, 2008).
Anti-authority is a disregard for rules or regulations. It is characterized by a pilot’s
unwillingness to accept that rules apply to their operational situation or themselves (FAA,
2016b). Anti-authority and other hazardous attitudes may influence the occurrence of violations
among pilots (English & Branaghan, 2012). While there are many different taxonomies for
classifying violations, behavior and attitudes are components of each (Rasmussen, 1982; Reason,
2008).
In a study on hazardous attitudes identified as causal factors in airline accidents, Nuñez
et. al. (2019) emphasized how anti-authority and invulnerability erode effective cockpit
communication. Anti-authority can especially influence pilots in the bush when they are
pressured by their company or their passengers to complete a flight. In a qualitative study on
bush pilot decision-making styles in the Australian Outback, researchers Michalski and Bearman
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(2014) interviewed 12 pilots, who reported making “substandard decisions because they did not
want to disappoint customers, . . . [pilots] also reported committing violations (such as flying
lower than regulations allow) because of customer pressure” (p. 292).
Antiauthority and invulnerability have been suggested as primers for regulatory
violations which were nine times more likely to end in a fatal accident in the state of Alaska than
the rest of the United States (Detwiler et al., 2006; 2008). These hazardous pilot attitudes and
behaviors have resulted in continued VFR flight into IMC conditions and eventually CFIT which
accounts for 80% of fatal accidents in Alaska (NTSB, 2020).
Contributing to anti-authority attitudes of pilots in bush Alaska are invulnerability and
macho. The Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge described a macho pilot as one who
tries to prove himself to others (FAA, 2016b). Macho is closely linked to invulnerability and
described as an expectation of being in control; it stems from machismo, a social construct where
one tries to prove their manhood and self-sufficiency (Stewart, 2006). Despite the masculine
connotations of macho, women can develop this attitude (Nuñez et al., 2019).
A social hierarchy exists in the bush. More experienced pilots may initiate younger pilots
in a fraternity-like manner and have an illusion of control. New or inexperienced pilots flying
with senior pilots exhibiting these at-risk attitudes may not voice safety concerns due to senior
pilot authority and end up complying with risky directives and suggestions (Michalski &
Bearman, 2014; Noort et al., 2021). Pilots who exhibit macho attitudes tend to be overconfident
and may attempt tasks for the admiration they will receive from their peers (Murray, 1999).
Invulnerability describes an attitude where a pilot feels they are immune to accidents or
will never be personally involved in an adverse safety event (Adhikari, 2015). This trait can lead
to a “cavalier” attitude toward safety and a “consequent laxity in following safety precautions,”
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(Stewart, 2006, p. 14). Pilots who show characteristics of invulnerability may accept flights
regardless of risk. Makarowski et al. (2016) discussed personality and risk tolerance in a study of
112 airline pilots. They suggested that pilots with the most experience adopt a higher risk
tolerance; they become more willing to accept flights in “very difficult and perilous” weather
conditions and embody attitudes of invulnerability (Makarowski et al., 2016, p. 304).
This finding by Makarowski et al. (2016) is affirmed by Hunter (2002) who in a study on
pilot risk perception and risk tolerance posited that pilots who do not recognize the risks
associated with adverse weather are more likely to engage in risky behavior associated with
weather decision-making. Furthermore, pilots who have successfully flown VFR into IMC are
more likely to repeat the behavior (Wiggins et al., 2012). Even though safety in environments
such as Alaska depends on “the sensitivity of employees to conditions that can lead to danger,”
pilots with high-risk appetite may ignore, or disregard, hazards that are present in bush flying
(Bearman et al., 2009, p. 1057).
Impulsiveness is the final hazardous attitude the FAA described. It is characterized by
pilots who act before thinking and often choose the first action that comes to mind (FAA,
2016b). Impulsiveness is incorporated in discussions on the Big Five personality traits as they
relate to pilot personalities (Fitzgibbons et al., 2000). Low conscientiousness is a significant
precursor to impulsiveness and anti-authority. Clarke and Robinson (2005) discussed several
personality traits associated with accident involvement: (a) carelessness and lack of self-control,
(b) impulsiveness, and (c) a lack of respect for authority. Impulsivity is highly correlated to
accident involvement and can be a predictor of risky decision-making (Causse et al., 2013).
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Ego and its Place in the Cockpit
Ego has been suggested as having a natural place in the cockpit; “pilots are affected by
their ego and the need to protect it” (O’Bryan, 2011, p. 11). Throughout the course of a pilot’s
career, they are evaluated almost constantly through organizational and social means. Formal
evaluations like recurrent training and line checks have explicit job-related outcomes. Socially,
pilots are evaluated against their peers and sometimes the evaluations can be harsh (Leigh &
Rissanen, 2018). In most situations, casual or formal, pilots do not like to look bad (Paletz et al.,
2009).
Murray (1999) provides clarity on a concept called “loss of face” and discussed
specifically its influences on pilots. Murray (1999) further states that an individual’s assessment
of how others view him is face (Murray, 1999). Participants in a study on Alaskan pilots showed
aversion to social disapproval; “this reluctance . . . was at times not very subtle, such as in
situations in which the pilot might ‘lose face’ or admit defeat in front of his or her peers” (Paletz
et al., 2009). To protect from a loss of face situation, pilots take risk, and furthermore, may not
disclose safety-relevant information or concerns (Noort et al., 2021). In a study on the immediate
actions taken by pilots who become lost or temporarily uncertain of their geographic position,
some general aviation pilots were unwilling to call for help, as it would “broadcast their failure
as pilots” (Gilbey & Hill, 2012, p. 785).
Protecting one’s ego frequently means withholding information that could be beneficial
for the pilot group as a whole. Face must be considered in both an individual and group setting
(Murray, 1999). In a crew environment, “the most dangerous aspect of ego may be how it affects
communications” (O’Bryan, 2011, p. 11). In a cross-sectional study on error, stress, and
teamwork, Sexton et al. (2000) compared the attitudes of airline pilots and intensive care medical
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personnel. More than half of the study participants had difficulty discussing mistakes due to
various factors, including personal reputation, expectations, and ego of other team members
(Sexton et al., 2000). Other variables, like pride in their job, may also lead some pilots to
withhold valuable safety information from their peers (Transport Canada, 2002).
Ego and narcissism may be linked due to their characteristics to protect or inflate a sense
of self (Gilliam, 2019; Ju et al., 2017). A 2017 study on Chinese aviation students linked a high
score of narcissism to a tendency to underestimate risk and participants’ vulnerability to it. The
findings suggest a pilot’s narcissism, or ego, may predispose them pilot to unrealistic optimism
in their risk perception (Ju et al., 2017). The unrealistic optimism creates an illusion of minimal
risk of negative safety outcomes and may lead to a greater willingness to take risks, especially
when compared to peers (Gilliam, 2019). Such pilots may not participate in safety-related
meetings or follow procedures due to their attitudes toward risk (Gilliam, 2019).
Goal Seduction and Plan Continuation Errors
“Concepts from the social psychology literature may illuminate the subtle ways in which
even highly trained, conscientious, and responsible pilots are led into situations in which unsafe
acts may occur” (Paletz et al., 2009, p. 437). Goal seduction, the persuasion of a desired outcome
to influence a pilot’s decision, is a factor in bush flying (Bearman et al., 2009). Goal seduction
may lead to errors when the target outcome or goal has too much influence on decision-making
(Bearman & Bremner, 2013). In a study on firefighters’ use of personal protective equipment,
Maglio et al. (2016) described how goal seduction leads to “misaligned priorities” (p. 562). It is a
pressure toward an unsafe decision at the expense of safety, often made to meet productivity
goals like on-time performance, to outperform competition, to fit in socially, or to get paid
(Maglio et al., 2016).
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Operational and social factors put pressure on pilots to reach outcomes with a “foot-inthe-door” approach. This is a persuasive technique in which compliance is obtained by getting a
pilot to agree to a small request (Dolinski, 2012). Once the person has agreed, they are far more
likely to agree to further and more complicated tasks (Dolinski, 2012). Management and peers
may make such requests. Pilots are more likely to continue flights in deteriorating conditions
knowing peers had completed the same routes successfully, or if they had completed flights in
similar conditions, demonstrating an example of social pressures on pilots (Paletz et al., 2009).
Foot-in-the-door persuasion may influence plan continuation error. Plan continuation
error is the tendency to remain fixed on the original course of action and can be associated with
the strong negative consequences caused by changing current plan trajectory away from the
initial goal (Causse et al., 2011; Velazquez, 2018). In aviation, several behavioral traps are
attributed to plan continuation error, including “get-there-itis" and VFR into IMC, one of the
leading causes of fatal accidents in Alaska (Velazquez, 2018).
In a 2013 study on pilots’ decisions to conduct a go-around, organizational goals and
incentive programs contributed to their decision to land in adverse conditions and participate in
more risky behavior (Causse et al., 2013). These findings were affirmed in a study on general
aviation pilots’ behaviors when flying near thunderstorms; the majority of pilots elected to
continue when they had made it past the midpoint of their flights (Boyd, 2017).
In a French study on military aviation accidents and incidents, three key factors
influencing pilots’ susceptibility to plan continuation error were discussed: (a) the pilots’
perceived ability to overcome an adverse situation, (b) inadequate company or procedural
training, and (c) lack of experience (Bourgeon et al., 2011). Furthermore, inability to
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appropriately perceive the risk associated with changing scenarios was significant in
perpetuating plan continuation errors among pilots (Léonore et al., 2009).
Rescue mission operations, like medical evacuations or search and rescue, are even more
susceptible to goal seduction, foot-in-the-door persuasion, and plan continuation error. Pilots in
Bearman et al.’s (2009) study on pilot decision-making admitted to taking more risk than usual
in these scenarios: “When you think you’re in search and rescue mode, when you think that
you’re going to save somebody, you’ll push things” (p. 558).
Helicopter emergency medical services is one of the most dangerous occupations in
civilian aviation; the percentage of fatal accidents compared to nonfatal accidents is higher than
all other subsets in the aviation industry (Greenhaw & Jamali, 2021). Night flying, marginal
weather conditions, and rough terrain contribute to the rate of helicopter emergency medical
services accidents (Greenhaw & Jamali, 2021). While most medevac flights in Alaska take place
in fixed-wing aircraft due to the vastness of the state, similar risks apply:
Pilots flying in Alaska may be particularly susceptible to the influence of social
psychological pressures because they often fly in marginal, ambiguous, and
deteriorating weather conditions; work within minimal infrastructure; and fly
missions that others rely on for basic necessities. (Paletz et al., 2009)
To be certified by the Commission on the Accreditation of Medical Transport Systems (2018),
operators comply with directives that restrict patient information available to pilots to mitigate
these pressures.
Social Theories
Social cognitive theory is a representation of human decision-making that encompasses
reciprocal interactions between three pressures: behavioral, environmental, and personal. These
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influences are bidirectional; as a result, people are products and producers of the environment
(Schunk & DiBenedetto, 2020; Wood & Bandura, 1989). This theory emphasizes observed
behavior: “Virtually all learning phenomena resulting from direct experience can occur
vicariously by observing people’s behavior and the consequences of it” (Wood & Bandura,
1989). The more someone relates to the person they are observing, the more likely they are to
model their behavior (Schunk & DiBenedetto, 2020). Additionally, positive outcomes more
strongly influence modeled behavior than negative outcomes deter it (Wood & Bandura, 1989).
Self-efficacy is a key factor of social cognitive theory. It is an individual’s belief that they
can execute a task toward specific performance related results (Bandura, 2001). Individual
accomplishments, and also observed accomplishments, can raise the individual’s self-efficacy
and further motivate them to accomplish goal-related tasks (Schunk & DiBenedetto, 2020).
Applying social cognitive theory concepts (i.e., self-efficacy) to health sciences showed promise
of patient progress in retaining behaviors to improve physical movement and diet change as
patients saw their peers’ improvement (Anderson et al., 2007; Stacey et al., 2015). In the aviation
field, a study on pilot training found that a person’s self-efficacy was a good predictor of success
in further training and transfer to the flight line (Davis et al., 2000). Furthermore, self-efficacy
had a direct, positive effect on both safety compliance and safety participation among collegiate
aviation pilots (Adjekum, 2017).
Social identity theory describes how a person defines themselves based on their
membership in certain groups (McLeod, 2019). A social group is where members have the same
characteristics or belong to the same social category (Stets & Burke, 2000). These groups could
be related to social class, family, education status, and so on, and they give a sense of identity
and belonging to social contexts (McLeod, 2019). Belonging to a group is an important aspect of
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a person’s self-image (Tajfel, 1974). The group a person identifies with is considered the “ingroup” and is associated with strong positive connotations and feelings from the membership.
The “out-group” receives negative bias, and differences between the in- and out-groups are
highlighted (Stets & Burke, 2000).
To belong to a group, a person must meet certain characteristics and “fit” (Burford, 2012;
Korte, 2007). The person then “adopts the norms” and “alters their personal behavior” to
conform to the group identity (Korte, 2007, p. 169). Decision-making is therefore influenced by
group behavior and values. Important learning occurs during indoctrination in new positions and
roles as an individual attempts to find their fit into the group (Korte, 2007). The transition from
trainee to qualified employee was a significant distinction in the medical field and accelerated
the “adoption of the professional identity” and the resources that came with it (Burford, 2012, p.
146). The experiences and teachings of the group to a newcomer may be more influential than
policy (“Social Identity is Key to Human Resources Development,” 2007).
In the aviation sector, many complex subgroups exist between pilots, flight attendants,
dispatchers, management, and maintenance personnel, to name a few (Ford et al., 2013).
Emphasizing belonging to an organization, instead of a group like “pilot” or “flight attendant,”
can mitigate risk factors and barriers to communication during emergency situations, especially
when a shared goal is desired and emphasized (Ford et al., 2013). Tangential findings from the
medical field highlight the necessity for managing miscommunication between in- and outgroups during patient care (Burford, 2012).
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
This ethnographic research intends to answer questions about factors that influence bush
pilot decision-making. Specifically, the method used was to explore how psychosocial and
organizational factors impact Alaska Part 135 pilots’ decision-making during flight operations. It
was envisaged that significant findings from this study could influence recommendations that
can positively influence policy and practices promoting safety in Alaska. This research adds to
the existing literature of Alaska Part 135 pilots.
The findings from this research provide potential benefits to other high-risk organizations
that operate in remote settings, such as mining and oil and gas exploration and production. Due
to the similarities of risk and human behavior in these industries, an understanding of cultural
and psychosocial factors that influence decision-making can provide critical safety intelligence
for developing effective and proactive safety controls.
Conceptual Framework
Pilot error is often cited as a major cause of accidents in the aviation industry (FAA,
2016b, p. 2-1). Reason (2008) suggested that aviation accidents are complex phenomena that are
the result of a combination of latent hazards and unsafe acts that continue to happen in a
sequential way. Environmental as well as organizational effects play a role when there are
weaknesses in safety barriers and defenses along the timeline of the events (i.e., contributing
factors). Therefore, solely attributing the cause of an aviation accident to pilot error does not help
to explain all the variables leading to the accident; controls are needed to prevent such future
events (Dekker, 2014).
The new view of human factors research, presented by Dekker (2014), focuses on human
error as a symptom rather than a cause. It seeks to understand why people make decisions and
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why it made sense to them at the time (Dekker, 2014). Hollnagel (2014), explored two
contrasting views on safety—those where things rarely go wrong, and those where outcomes are
almost always positive (Hollnagel, 2014). The different perspectives of Safety I and Safety II
result in processes that are either reactive or proactive, respectively. Using this framework,
human error research focuses on how things usually go right, but occasionally go wrong, and
attempts to provide answers for why (Hollnagel, 2014).
Researcher’s Position and Worldview
The researcher has specific interest in bush operations. The researcher was employed as a
medevac and air taxi pilot in Alaska and operated across the state under Part 135 rules for 2
years. The researcher also flew for a Part 121 airline that serviced bush communities and worked
in tandem with its Part 135 operation to deliver goods and people to small villages across Alaska
in a hub-and-spoke style operation. In January 2019, three of the researcher’s coworkers died in
an aircraft accident. Aircraft accident report findings were inconclusive as to probable and
contributory causes due to the inability of investigators to promptly access the accident site
location or to recover human remains (NTSB, 2021c).
This accident further influenced the researcher’s decision to explore and gain a more indepth understanding of how company organizational culture and other psychosocial factors
influence decision-making styles among Part 135 pilots in Alaska. As a medevac pilot, the
researcher’s passengers (in this case patients) were occasionally victims of aircraft accidents
themselves. The researcher has listened to years of hangar talk and heard how ego and hazardous
attitudes can manifest themselves in bush pilots.
The researcher took a constructivist approach to this research due to its focus on the
contexts in which people live and work. In contrast to other theoretical frameworks that attempt
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to verify theories, this approach seeks understanding of the historical and cultural perspectives of
participants (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). In this paradigm, efforts are made to “understand the
viewpoints of the subject being observed” (Kivunja & Kuyini, 2017, p. 33). Other research
paradigms, such as the postpositivist worldview, focus on theory verification and empirical
measurement often best suited to quantitative research.
The transformative and pragmatic viewpoints focus on political and problem-centered
approaches, respectively, and were not suitable for this study (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The
constructivist premise is that “humans must interact with and reflect on social life in order to
know and understand it” (Saldaña & Omasta, 2018, p. 143). This approach emphasizes the
importance of social inquiry and helps explore how pilots interact based on the history and social
context of their environment.
Data Collection Methods
Three recent accidents were presented as case studies for the content analysis in this
study. The case study accidents were chosen due to their recency and impact on aviation safety
in Alaska. Additional NTSB data encompassing the 10-year period between 2008 and 2018 were
analyzed from the NTSB accident database. Significant themes were derived from both case
studies and content analysis of NTSB accident data. These themes were instructive in
formulating items for the primary research instrument which was a semi-structured interview
with relevant respondents.
Each participant interview lasted approximately 1-hour and was conducted via the
electronic video platform Zoom due to the Covid-19 Pandemic restricting in-person meetings.
This platform also eased the difficulty of scheduling in-person meetings around multiple pilot
schedules. Eight interviews were completed and lasted an average of 58 minutes. The interviews
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were recorded and stored in a password-protected file on the interviewer’s computer. Manual
transcriptions were completed following the interviews. These interviews were then condensed
for clarity and to ease the coding process.
The semi-structured format consisted of open-ended questions to give participants the
latitude to respond organically. It was the researcher’s goal to avoid leading questions. Followup questions were developed after a practice interview with the researcher’s peer. The data from
this practice interview was not used in the analysis of this study but helped to gauge potential
responses and draft possible follow-up questions. Follow-up questions were useful to direct the
flow of the conversation and to further discuss information the participants felt was important.
The beta-testing of these question items allowed the researcher to move indirections best
fit to the participants’ answers but was structured enough to keep consistency between them. The
draft semi-structured questions began with basic information about participants and gradually
transitioned into more detailed questions about the participants’ beliefs and experiences flying in
Alaska. Finally, a list of primary questions which had been developed and beta-tested for
comprehensibility and consistency was submitted to and approved by the University of North
Dakota Institutional Review Board (UND IRB; see Appendix A). The full list of questions is
included in Appendix B.
Research Ethics
Due to the human element of semi-structured interviews, the study was submitted to and
approved by the UND IRB. Vulnerable groups are not a focus of this study, and all participants
were legally adults and could provide individual consent to participate. Due to the nature of
aviation in Alaska, where the community is smaller, all potentially identifying information was
redacted from the transcriptions. Names of people and companies, aircraft types, and in some
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cases, locations were removed when the researcher felt someone familiar with Part 135
operations in Alaska could identify the company or individual participant. If an accident or
incident was brought up that had been high-profile or discussed in the media, the information
remained in the transcript.
The study was considered low-risk for all the participants and consent forms were signed
via DocuSign™. These consent forms will be kept for 3 years following the completion of the
research. Afterwards, they will be disposed according to UND IRB procedures. Each participant
received a copy of the consent form, which detailed procedures of the study and contact
information should the participant wish to reach out to the researcher for more information.
Participant Selection
Participants were selected using purposive, multi-case sampling in which a breadth of
age, experience, and type of operating experience was desired and sought out among the many
Part 135 operators in Alaska through the researcher’s professional network. Initial contact was
made via email with a brief overview of the study and the researcher’s contact information.
Follow-up questions, scheduling, and interview declines were done via email or telephone. Of 13
people contacted, eight agreed to be interviewed.
Extant literature on qualitative research tends to avoid suggesting a concrete number of
participants required to ensure data saturation (Guest et al., 2006; Saunders & Townsend, 2016).
Data saturation has been reached in similar (albeit larger scale) studies with between 12 and 28
participants (Bearman et al., 2009; Michalski & Bearman, 2014). For the scope of this research,
eight participants were interviewed. The potential to interview additional participants (up to 12)
was approved; however, data saturation was reached with eight participants.
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Interviews were conducted between April and June of 2021. After agreeing to participate
in the study, interview dates were selected, and the IRB-approved consent form was distributed.
The signed consent form was received prior to starting any interviews. Each interview began
with a brief overview of the study. In this overview, the researcher confirmed that participants
consented to being recorded. The researcher explained the interview process and emphasized that
participation was voluntary. They could end, pause, or skip questions as they wished. The
researcher then answered any questions before the interview began.
Participant Data
The participants represented a cross section of Part 135 operators in Alaska. Their
employers ranged from small operations with 12 pilots to larger organizations with over 60
pilots. Operationally, these pilots supported freight, passenger, medevac, private contractors, and
tourism and lodge industries within Alaska. Geographically, the collective participants flew
across the entire state of Alaska, with particular emphasis in regions such as the North Slope,
Southeast Alaska, western Alaska, and the Aleutian Island chain. Their experience was diverse—
one pilot was just beginning their career, where others have been flying in Alaska for over 20
years. Outside of Part 135 line pilot duties, previous experience included Part 91 and 121
operations, air traffic control, Chief Pilot, and management positions.
Participants ranged in age from 22 to 57 years old, with a mean age of 34.375 years.
Their experience ranged from 1 year of commercial experience and 550 hours to 20 years and
over 13,000 hours in Alaska. Alaska time is a metric used by employers and insurance providers
in the state and was the primary metric for this study. It refers to time spent flying in Alaska,
much like “instrument time” would describe time spent flying in IFR conditions. The mean

42

Alaska time was 5,531 hours and years of experience was 8 years, 3 months. Two of the eight
interviewees were female.
Data Analysis Methods
Ethnographic methods were used in this study. “The literature may be deficient in
actually knowing how the group works because the group is not in the mainstream. . . . Its ways
are so different that readers may not identify with the group” (Creswell & Poth, 2018). An
ethnographic design was chosen due to its emphasis on cultural themes of the participant group
and the limitations with existing human factors literature on Part 135 pilots in Alaska.
Three case studies were presented to highlight recent accidents in Alaska. These case
studies were subject to a thematic analysis, which helped to guide the development of interview
questions. The case study analysis, along with the NTSB accident data, was used to form a base
for the remainder of the study, which used participant perceptions and opinions. The NTSB
historical data analysis involved content theming of personnel, organizational, or environmental
influences that were contributory to accidents in Alaska. The analysis further explored the
relationships among these factors. The themes from the NTSB historical data analysis were used
to support findings from the case studies and interview data during the data triangulation for the
discussion section.
Interview data were segmented into different themes as required. Data were coded using
value and descriptive methods, then compared. Value coding is particularly appropriate to
explore “cultural values . . . intrapersonal and interpersonal participant experiences and actions in
case studies, oral history, critical ethnography, psychology, and sociology” (Saldaña & Omasta,
2018). Descriptive coding helped to analyze physical environments and classify participants’
actions and routines (Saldaña & Omasta, 2018). Themes derived from the interview data were
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triangulated with results from the case study and NTSB data analysis which helped to postulate
theories about factors that influence bush pilots’ decision-making in the Alaskan environment.
External Validation
To increase validity of the interview data, a subject matter expert (SME) with extensive
experience in aviation and research in Alaska was contacted to provide an external and
independent audit of the themes derived. Text used in the coding process was sent to the SME
without any associated codes. Each data point was one to five sentences long and encompassed
the researcher’s coded segment without any surrounding context. While it is more difficult to
attain a high level of agreement using small sections of text, the overall complexity of the
external validation is low with small segments (O’Connor & Joffe, 2020).
The SME looked at a cross section of interview data. Due to time constraints, the SME
was able to validate one third of the interview data, or 75 data points. The material sent to the
SME was randomized to provide a representative cross section of interviews, themes, and codes
analyzed in the data set. O’Connor and Joffe (2020) suggest there are disagreements among
qualitative researchers on what constitute acceptable reliability and how to determine agreement
between coders in qualitative research. However, the SME provided an independent analysis of
the data by coding the data points “blind” without reference or knowledge of the researcher’s
code book (see Appendix C) to see if there was a level of agreement and consistency in the
codes/themes between the researcher and SME.
For this study, a percentage was calculated based on whether the SME’s codes fit into the
overall themes of the researcher’s data set. There was 78% reliability between the two. Given the
specific nature of the data sent to the SME (i.e., small data points without context), the small
cross section of data (33% reviewed), and the exploratory nature of this research, the reliability is
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appropriate for a study of this scale. An example of codes is provided in Appendix D of this
study.
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS
Research on aviation safety in Alaska has focused on historical accident reports and
primarily used quantitative analysis. Organizations such as the FAA and the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health have published materials on the safety hazards of aviation in
Alaska (Bailey et al., 2000; FAA, 2021b; The National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, 2018). These publications highlighted risks associated with the challenging and diverse
Alaskan environment, whose weather is unpredictable and whose terrain is unforgiving.
Other studies looked at operational pressures and the impact they have on pilot decisionmaking (Bearman et al., 2009; Conway et al., 2005; Michalski & Bearman, 2014). These studies
were some of the first that utilized pilot interviews as their main data collection method. Results
of these studies were influential in the development and organization of this research, which
provides an analysis of current trends in the Alaska aviation pilot group and answers questions
regarding the psychosocial and organizational influences on pilot decision-making. The central
research question is as follows:
What psychosocial and organizational factors influence decision-making of 14 CFR 135
pilots in Alaska and contribute to incidents and accidents among this group of pilots?
Further underlying research questions were explored as a critical supplement to the
central research question. They are as follows:
1. What are the environmental and operational factors that make flight operations in
Alaska challenging for Part 135 pilots?
2. What are the organizational factors that influence decision-making among Part 135
pilots in Alaska?
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3. What are the psychosocial and cultural factors that influence decision-making
among Part 135 pilots in Alaska?
4. How do prior experiences and generational/age differences affect decisionmaking during operations among Part 135 pilots in Alaska?
5. What is the perception of the safety culture among Part 135 pilots in Alaska
and how does it influence hazard identification and safety risk decisions?
Findings from three case studies on recent accidents in Alaska are summarized below to
highlight the continuing need for research aimed at improving operational safety in Alaskan
aviation. The themes gathered from the case studies helped guide the development of interview
questions and were triangulated with the NTSB accident data content analysis.
Case Studies
Three cases studies are presented as part of the content analysis on Part 135 operators in
Alaska. All three accidents highlight operational deficiencies regarding safety culture among
operators and provides insight into pilot decision-making during operational activities. The three
accidents were thoroughly investigated by the NTSB, and the information presented is
condensed from the final NTSB reports. Two of these accidents occurred between the 2008 and
2018 period used for the brief analysis of historical accident data in this study. The third
occurred in 2019 and highlights a continuing need for investigation of accident factors among
Part 135 operators in Alaska.
Promech Aviation CFIT
On 25 June 2015, a turbine-powered, float-equipped DHC-3 (Otter) collided with terrain
24 NM east northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The commercial pilot and all eight passengers were
killed in the accident. The flight was being operated as a flightseeing tour in conjunction with a
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cruise ship for passenger excursions. The operator, Promech Air, of Ketchikan, Alaska, was a
Part 135 operator conducting on-demand sightseeing tours. At the time of the accident, marginal
visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions were reported in the area (NTSB, 2017a).
Ketchikan is one of the largest cruise ship hubs in Alaska. Cruise lines offer package
deals with flightseeing operators during the stopovers in Ketchikan Harbor. For this particular
incident, the tour was sold as part of a “cruise/fly” package where passengers embark on a boat
ride out to a cove in Rudyerd Bay, and then they fly back to Ketchikan Harbor via float plane to
meet the cruise ship before its departure for the next port. If tour operators failed to get
passengers back to the dock by the “all-aboard” time, they became responsible for costs
associated with transporting the passengers to the next port of call. The passengers were
scheduled to reach the float dock at Rudyerd Bay for an 11:45 am departure back to Ketchikan
Harbor (NTSB, 2017a).
Four float planes operated by Promech departed Rudyerd Bay in 5-minute intervals.
Passengers had a 12:30 pm all-aboard time for the cruise ship departure. The first three aircraft
carried passengers and the fourth was a repositioning flight. All four aircraft were running
behind schedule. The accident airplane departed Rudyerd Bay at 12:07 pm and was the third
aircraft in queue. Pilots were able to choose their routing back to Ketchikan from two routes. The
long route took approximately 30 minutes and was the preferred route when the weather was low
due to its location over the water.
Pilots along this route were able to descend beneath cloud layers and have options for
landing sites, as the aircraft were on floats. The short route took approximately 25 minutes and
was selected by the accident pilot. The short route was more popular due to the scenic nature of
the area. The first and fourth aircraft also took the short route, while the second elected to take
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the long route back to Ketchikan Harbor. The tours showcased the channels, fjords, and
mountainous terrain of Southeast Alaska. Figure 13 shows the various flight paths on the day of
the accident.

Figure 13
Short, Long, and Accident Flight Paths on the Day of the Accident

Note. From [Google Maps directions for flying from Ruyderd Bay, Alaska to Ketchikan Harbor,
Alaska], by Google, n.d. (https://goo.gl/). From “Collision With Terrain, Promech Air, Inc. de
Havilland DHC-3, N270PA, Ketchikan, AK. June 25, 2015. (Aircraft Accident Report No.
NTSB/AAR-17/02),” by the National Transportation Safety Board, 2017, p. 2
(https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1702.pdf).

When the accident aircraft failed to return to Ketchikan Harbor, the operator began a
search effort to locate the aircraft. An emergency locator transmitter signal was detected, and a
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helicopter from a local operator was dispatched to locate the downed aircraft. After waiting for
the weather to lift, the pilot of the helicopter confirmed that the aircraft had crashed near Ella
Lake. Search and rescue volunteers reached the site later that afternoon and confirmed all
occupants of the aircraft had been killed in the accident.
Data recovered from the aircraft’s Chelton electronic flight information system (EFIS), in
conjunction with digital photographs recovered from passengers’ phones and cameras, provided
information about the accident. The aircraft did not have a cockpit voice recorder system to aid
in the investigation (NTSB, 2017a).
Pilot Information
The pilot held a commercial certificate and was properly certified to operate this flight for
Promech. He was 64 years old and had a current medical. The pilot had approximately 4,070
flight hours, 500 of which were in the DHC-2 and 50 of which were in the DHC-3. He had 1,200
hours flying in Alaska and 152 hours of flying time with Promech at the time of the accident.
Information collected from his roommates and wife showed that he had plenty of sleep
opportunity the night before the accident. Alcohol or other toxicology was not a factor (NTSB,
2017a).
Most of his colleagues described him as a competent, conservative decision maker. A few
outliers, however, “raised questions about the pilot’s judgement regarding weather-related
decisions” (NTSB, 2017a, p. 8). One pilot stated that he displayed invincible attitudes and that he
had trouble with IMC/CFIT escape maneuvers. Another pilot described an incident when the
pilot disregarded warnings about low weather. He eventually had to backtrack and ran low on
fuel prior to landing back in Ketchikan Harbor. Both of these pilots recalled a separate incident
when strong downdrafts in Rudyerd Bay prohibited them from landing—the accident pilot
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landed anyway and his subsequent logbook entry read: “Misty trip, thought I was dead” (NTSB,
2017a, p. 8).
The pilot was a seasonal worker and resident of Idaho. He rented a house with two other
Promech pilots and one’s wife. They described him as a cheerful and pleasant person. The
accident pilot’s wife said that on the day of the accident he was planning to move to an
apartment he found he had some personality disagreements with another colleague and preferred
to live alone.
Route
The accident aircraft departed Rudyerd Bay at 12:07 pm for Ketchikan Harbor. The pilot
chose to take the short route. This route was over Ella Narrows, a low-lying valley at 100 to 300
ft with surrounding mountains between 2,000 and 2,500 ft. The pilot entered the narrows at
1,300 ft and data recovered from the EFIS showed that the aircraft descended rapidly to 1,000 ft
before climbing again to 1,300 ft. The route flew over Ella Lake where, at the far end, after
passing two similar looking mountains, the pilots would normally turn slightly right to continue
to Ketchikan.
The accident aircraft passed over a ridge on the Western shore of the lake at 1,500 ft.
After crossing the ridge, the pilot maintained heading and, 2 seconds prior to impact, he pitched
up rapidly, pulling 2+ G on the aircraft. Photographs captured by a passenger’s cell phone
showed weather conditions prior to impact with the second mountain. Low clouds and fog had
obscured the surrounding terrain, and the pilot turned west after passing the first of the two
similar looking mountains. Had he continued further down the lake before turning, he would
have cleared the terrain at his selected altitude. Figures 14 and 15 show pictures taken by the
passengers prior to the crash.

51

This was the third tour of the day for the accident pilot. He flew the first aircraft in the
first tour group, electing to take the short route. Aside from isolated rain showers along the route,
he reported good weather. The other two pilots in the group elected to take the long route to
Rudyerd Bay. On the return leg, all three attempted the short route but ultimately diverted off
their course to join the long route back to Ketchikan Harbor. On this leg, the accident pilot
departed 15 minutes prior to the other two pilots and flew a circuitous route including “course
reversals and substantial changes in altitude” (NTSB, 2017a, p. 31).
On the second tour, the accident pilot was the fourth of six airplanes. All of the aircraft
flew the long route, and all but one aircraft descended below 500 ft above ground level (AGL) on
the outbound leg to avoid weather. The accident pilot and the company president/CEO both flew
below 400 ft AGL. Another pilot on the flight expressed concern about the weather before
departing, yet ultimately flew that tour. On arrival back in Ketchikan, he reported he was
relieved to be done with tours for the day (NTSB, 2017a). Figure 16 shows the accident flight
path recreated by the NTSB.
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Figure 14
Photo Captured From Passenger’s Cell Phone 28 Seconds Prior to Impact

Note. From “Collision With Terrain, Promech Air, Inc. de Havilland DHC-3, N270PA,
Ketchikan, AK. June 25, 2015. (Aircraft Accident Report No. NTSB/AAR-17/02),” by the
National Transportation Safety Board, 2017, p. 5 (https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1702.pdf).
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Figure 15
Photo Captured From Passenger’s Cell Phone 21 Seconds Prior to Impact

Note. From “Collision With Terrain, Promech Air, Inc. de Havilland DHC-3, N270PA,
Ketchikan, AK. June 25, 2015. (Aircraft Accident Report No. NTSB/AAR-17/02),” by the
National Transportation Safety Board, 2017, p. 5 (https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1702.pdf).
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Figure 16
Accident Flight Path Recreated With Data From the Aircraft EFIS

Note. From “Collision With Terrain, Promech Air, Inc. de Havilland DHC-3, N270PA,
Ketchikan, AK. June 25, 2015. (Aircraft Accident Report No. NTSB/AAR-17/02),” by the
National Transportation Safety Board, 2017, p. 6 (https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1702.pdf).

Meteorological Information
National Weather Service forecasts at the time of the accident called for scattered layers
at 2,500 ft and broken to overcast layers at 5,000 to 25,000 ft. Isolated ceilings below 1,000 ft
were forecast for the area, and visibility was forecast between 3 and 5 mi with light rain and
mist. Airman’s meteorological information (AIRMET) data for mountain obscuration was
forecast. Ketchikan International Airport (PAKT) was the nearest weather reporting station and
was 24 mi southwest of the accident site. The station was reporting winds 15 gusting 23 kt, 6 mi
visibility with rain and mist, few clouds at 800 ft, broken clouds at 1,200 ft, and overcast at 2,700
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ft. The Terminal Aerodrome Forecast called for increasing winds and a period of lower ceilings
of 1,000 ft. MVFR and IFR conditions prevailed throughout the forecast.
An FAA weather camera facing the direction of the accident site showed ceilings
obscuring higher terrain at the time of the accident. Photographs taken from passengers in the
first flight to depart Rudyerd Bay (approximately 10 minutes before the accident aircraft) show
the entrance to Ella Narrows. Additional photographs, along with information gathered from the
pilots of the first and fourth Promech aircraft, were analyzed to paint a picture of conditions
along the flight path.
The first and fourth pilots described flying underneath cloud layers at 1,600 to 1,700 ft
and 1,200 to 1,300 ft respectively. Both encountered rain, and visibility was reduced due to mist,
but the fourth Promech pilot stated that visibility never dropped below 2 mi over the lake. When
shown a photograph of the accident location, he recalled that visibility looked to be less than 2
mi in that area at the time of the accident. He told investigators that he did not feel comfortable
turning to the west to continue the flight toward Ketchikan until he was 2 to 3 mi clear of terrain
due to the reduced visibility of 1 to 2 mi.
An analysis of photographs taken from passengers in the first aircraft determined that the
pilot was flying at an altitude of 300 to 400 ft AGL. In one photograph, the accident site is
shown in the background and terrain is obscured above 1,000 ft. Other Ketchikan area operators
cancelled flights for the day citing weather concerns. However, in Figure 17, a competitor’s
aircraft is visible in the upper right corner of the photograph.
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Figure 17
Photo Taken by Passenger on First Promech Flight

Note. The accident aircraft struck the mountain obscured in the background approximately 1 NM
north of this location. From “Collision With Terrain, Promech Air, Inc. de Havilland DHC-3,
N270PA, Ketchikan, AK. June 25, 2015. (Aircraft Accident Report No. NTSB/AAR-17/02),” by
the National Transportation Safety Board, 2017, p. 21 (https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1702.pdf).

Aircraft Information
The aircraft used in this flight, a de Havilland DHC-3 Otter, is a popular aircraft for air
tours across the state of Alaska. This aircraft was modified with a turbine engine and was
equipped with floats. Maintenance on the aircraft was performed in accordance with FAA
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guidelines and the investigation found no reason to believe maintenance discrepancies were
associated with the accident.
A Chelton EFIS provided flight data to the pilots en route. The system included a primary
flight display that showed airspeed and altitude information. The multifunction display (MFD)
could be configured to show a moving map, aircraft position, and navigation information. The
Chelton EFIS was first-generation technology used in the Capstone project. This project
provided operators free, advanced avionics to reduce accident rates in the state. According to the
NTSB (2017a) investigation, almost all operators with similar missions in Southeast Alaska used
the Chelton EFIS.
The Chelton EFIS had an integrated terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS). The
TAWS had forward-looking terrain awareness, which was displayed on the moving map via a
color display. An integrated caution system provided aural and visual flags to alert the pilot to
potential terrain hazards. The Chelton TAWS met FAA guidelines that each turbine-powered
operator is required to be equipped with a TAWS.
Pilots for Promech used it as a primary tool for identifying terrain along their flight
routing. However, multiple pilots have described how the color-coded overlay from the TAWS
obscured terrain features and inhibited their ability to accurately identify hazards along their
route. Additionally, during takeoffs and landings, nuisance alerts were common. Outside of
Ketchikan, all takeoffs and landings were made off-airport in areas surrounded by terrain. The
nuisance alerts prompted Promech pilots to frequently inhibit the TAWS using a toggle switch
on the instrument panel. In the accident aircraft wreckage, the switch was set to “inhibit.” A
passenger photograph confirmed the switch was in the inhibit position during flight.
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In 2007, database improvements were made to the Chelton navigation system. The
accident aircraft had data cards from an old 2003 update. This information is significant because
inland bodies of water were not depicted on the MFD in that version; rather, they appeared as
terrain. Despite this, pilots interviewed following the accident described the system as a useful
tool for terrain awareness.
Organizational Information
At the time of the accident, 90% of Promech’s operations were on-demand tours. The fall
prior, the company decided to end its scheduled services due to loss of revenue over the previous
few years. In addition to its operation in Ketchikan, AK, Promech had a satellite operation in
Key West, Florida, where the chief pilot was based. Other operational personnel, including the
assistant chief pilot, the director of operations, the director of maintenance, and the company
president/CEO were all based in Ketchikan (NTSB, 2017a).
The director of operations (DO) self-described his position as a “jack of all trades.” Per
their general operations manual (GOM), he was responsible for encouraging and promoting
safety within the company. He was also responsible for the oversight of training for flight and
ground support personnel. He flew the line approximately 3 to 4 times per week (NTSB, 2017a).
The assistant chief pilot had been promoted from within the company. He was
responsible for flying the line, maintaining pilot records, and assisting with pilot training. He had
recently become a company check airman (NTSB, 2017a).
Promech had no formal safety program. Their GOM outlined procedures for safety
reporting, stating that “any employee who witnesses an unsafe condition or procedure is
responsible to report the unsafe condition/procedure to his/her supervisor” (NTSB, 2017a, p. 25).
The GOM also had a safety reporting form where employees could describe concerns and write
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corrective actions. This form could be submitted anonymously using the safety reporting box, a
physical drop box in the employee lounge.
There was no non-punitive program to protect pilots from retaliatory actions. When
interviewed, the DO stated that he believed the small nature of the company created a safety
culture where pilots were able to voice their concerns directly to the DO. A verbal report was
much more likely than a written report. Their company bulletin board, outside of the dispatch
offices, was the main method for communicating safety-relevant data to the pilot group and
employees. The DO had previously been part of formal safety programs yet felt Promech could
be successful using their informal techniques.
Despite the DO’s confidence in the safety culture and reporting at Promech, management
was unaware that the accident pilot had previously struck trees with his floats on landing. They
were also unaware that the pilot had turned around due to poor weather along the short route the
morning of the accident. Two other Promech pilots were forced to find alternate routing around
the Ella Lake area during morning tours the day of the accident.
When interviewed by the NTSB, there was confusion among the Promech pilot group
when asked who was responsible for company safety programs. The interviews also unearthed
the varied attitude toward the company’s safety culture—some pilots thought they were “safety
conscious and felt at ease bringing up any safety concerns” (NTSB, 2017a, p. 26). Others,
however, described conditions in which management pressured them to fly through marginal
weather:
He expressed concern to Promech’s President/CEO that the weather conditions
were not good enough to fly. He stated that the response he received was, “That’s
just Alaska weather,” so he flew the tour. This pilot also reported that he
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overheard the company President/CEO expressing frustration in the company
office when he saw (using the company’s ADS-B display) that one of the pilots
was returning from the accident tour via the long route. He also stated that, during
initial training, the Assistant Chief Pilot, when talking about weather minimums,
told him and a group of other Promech pilots that they had to bend the rules
because they were operating in Alaska. He said that the Assistant Chief Pilot also
said that, if one pilot turned around while the others made it through, he and that
pilot were going to “have a conversation.” This pilot, who had not previously
flown commercially in Alaska before working for Promech, said he just assumed
“that’s the culture [in Alaska]. . . . It’s like, ‘we push through, we push through.’”
(NTSB, 2017a, p. 27)
A different pilot described an event where, after he saw the accident pilot disappear into
the clouds on an unrelated flight, he radioed the pilot to ask how the weather was, saying it
looked IFR. After hearing the exchange on company radio, management threatened to fire him if
he ever mentioned “IFR” on the radio again (NTSB, 2017a).
Operational Control
Per the Promech GOM, the chief pilot, assistant chief pilot, director of operations,
company president, and director of maintenance all had operational control. Limited operational
control could be granted in part to the flight schedulers and the pilots. Operational control refers
to initiating and terminating flights. In instances where operational control was delegated to the
flight schedulers and the pilots, both had to agree conditions were safe to dispatch a flight. They
were expected to monitor and communicate changing weather conditions, and either could
terminate a flight at any time.
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On the day of the accident, the flight scheduler said she had no conversations with the
accident pilot other than pleasantries in the morning. He gave a weather report to her when he
was outbound on his first flight for the day. The company president/CEO was the only member
of management on duty that morning, and he had no substantial interactions with the accident
pilot. Operational control had been delegated to the flight scheduler. She had worked at Promech
for 5 years and as a scheduler for three summers. She had not received any recurrent training
since her initial training.
Training
Pilots participated in a voluntary CFIT avoidance training program. The material for this
program was based on NTSB Safety Recommendation A-08-61. It was created in conjunction
with local Ketchikan area operators, the NTSB, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health, FAA Juneau Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), and the Medallion Foundation.
The Promech CFIT Avoidance Manual was created with Medallion Foundation resources and
consisted of ground and simulator training in an FAA-approved aviation training device.
Scenarios in the course required pilots to recognize and escape from an inadvertent IMC
encounter.
The usefulness of this experience with the aviation training device was up for debate.
Other local area operators discussed that nothing was comparable to real experience and that
juggling other tasks while trying to fly through mountain passes was not replicable in the
simulator. The DO and another company pilot differed in their assessment of the accident pilot’s
skills when asked to demonstrate escape maneuvers as part of flight training. The DO had
confidence in his abilities. The other pilot questioned them and said he thought the pilot
transitioned from the DHC-2 to the DHC-3 before he was ready.
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Findings and Analysis
The final NTSB (2017a) report discussed the different factors influencing the accident in
depth, as they are abbreviated above. A focus on outdated navigational equipment in the EFIS
and lack of appropriate use of the inhibit switch on the TAWS were discussed in the accident
findings. Schedule pressures to meet cruise ship all-aboard times, in addition to flying pressures
among competitors in the area, influenced the pilot’s decision to continue the flight.
Cultural and peer-based pressures, such as the company president/CEO flying lower than
VFR minimums on the day of the accident and the pilot’s attempt to emulate the behavior of
more experienced and skilled pilots contributed to the company safety culture of Promech and
ultimately to the accident. The CFIT training conducted by Promech was inadequate to properly
prepare pilots for actual real-world encounters with lower-than-expected weather. This,
combined with the pilot’s performance in training, was significant.
Finally, operational control was cited as a factor in this flight. Had the flight scheduler
received proper training or been more experienced, she would have had the opportunity to cancel
the flight when there was no proper conference between her and the pilot before departure
(NTSB, 2017a). This combination of factors, among others discussed above, resulted in the
following probable cause from the NTSB:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this
accident was (1) the pilot’s decision to continue visual flight into an area of instrument
meteorological conditions, which resulted in his geographic disorientation and controlled
flight into terrain; and (2) Promech’s company culture, which tacitly endorsed flying in
hazardous weather and failed to manage the risks associated with the competitive
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pressures affecting Ketchikan-area air tour operators; its lack of a formal safety program;
and its inadequate operational control of flight releases. (NTSB, 2017a, p. 68)
Recommendations made following the accident can be found in Appendix E of this study.
Also included are recommendations made prior to the accident.

Table 1
Themes From Promech Aviation CFIT Accident
Case study

Theme 1

Theme 2

Theme 3

Theme 4

Theme 5

Promech
Aviation CFIT

Inadequate
training

Company
culture

Inappropriate
use of
equipment

Inadequate
safety
programs

Operational
control

Togiak CFIT
On 2 October 2016, a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan collided with terrain approximately
10 NM northwest of Togiak Airport (PATG). The two commercial pilots and sole passenger
were killed in the accident, and the aircraft was destroyed. The flight was operated by Hageland
Aviation Services, Inc., doing business as (d/b/a) Ravn Connect, Flight 3153. The flight was
operated under 14 C.F.R. Part 135 rules and was a scheduled commuter flight. The crew was
operating under VFR at the time of the accident (NTSB, 2018).
The flight from Quinhagak, Alaska (PAGH) to Togiak, Alaska (PATG), was the third leg
out of five for the day. The crew started the first leg around 09:30 am Alaskan Standard Time
(AKST) and flew from Bethel, Alaska (PABE) to Togiak (PATG). They then departed Togiak
around 10:44 am for Quinhagak (PAGH). The crew flew the second leg at approximately 4,500
ft mean sea level (MSL). After offloading cargo and loading their passenger, the crew departed
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back to Togiak at 11:33 am AKST along the same route. On the accident leg, they flew at 1,000
ft MSL. This altitude gave the crew between 500 and 700 ft of terrain clearance for the majority
of the flight. A mountain ridge approximately 10 NM northwest of the Togiak Airport
intersected the direct route between PAQH and PATG. The highest elevation of this ridge was
approximately 2,485 ft (NTSB, 2018).
A second Ravn Connect flight departed PAQH for PATG 2 minutes after Flight 3153.
The pilots of this flight initially flew a similar route to Flight 3153; however, citing weather
concerns, they altered their course farther south to avoid “the unexpected presence of valley fog”
(NTSB, 2018, p. 2). This course change allowed the aircraft to avoid the weather and stay over
lower terrain along their route. When the second aircraft landed in Togiak, they noticed that the
accident aircraft had not yet arrived despite their earlier departure time. They recalled no radio
communications from the accident aircraft and did not see the accident aircraft while they were
traversing the mountains.
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Figure 18
Accident Aircraft Flight Path

Note. Accident aircraft flight path in red, second aircraft flight path in blue. Large dots represent
Spidertracks data. The solid blue is a series of close ADS-B data points. From “Collision With
Terrain, Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. d/b/a Ravn Connect Flight 3153, Cessna N208SD,
Togiak, Alaska. October 2, 2016 (Report No. NTSB/AAR-18/02),” by the National
Transportation Safety Board, 2018, p. 2
(https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1802.pdf). From [Google
Maps directions for flying from Quinhagak, Alaska to Togiak, Alaska], by Google, n.d.
(https://goo.gl/).
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The search and rescue coordinator from the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center
notified the Hageland DO of an emergency locator transmitter signal from the accident aircraft at
approximately 1214 AKST. The company then pulled the Spidertracks data (a satellite tracking
device) and realized it had not been updated in over 20 minutes. The second aircraft was redispatched to search for Flight 3153 but was unable to locate them due to obscuring clouds. After
a weather delay, the Alaska State Trooper helicopter was able to locate the wreckage. The
accident site was accessed on foot shortly thereafter (NTSB, 2018).
Wreckage found at the scene of the accident indicated that the aircraft struck a ridge at
approximately 2,300 ft MSL in an extreme nose-up attitude. The fuselage of the aircraft came to
rest on the other side of the ridge at 1,500 ft MSL. The right wing rested approximately 200 ft
below it.
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Figure 19
Impact and Wreckage

Note. From “Collision With Terrain, Hageland Aviation Services, Inc. d/b/a Ravn Connect Flight
3153, Cessna N208SD, Togiak, Alaska. October 2, 2016 (Report No. NTSB/AAR-18/02),” by
the National Transportation Safety Board, 2018, p. 4
(https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1802.pdf).

Pilot Information
The pilot in command (PIC) was a commercial-rated pilot with flight instructor
certificates (CFI, CFII, MEI). He had been flying for Hageland for 11 months and had a total of
6,465 hours of flight time, over 75% of which was as a PIC in Alaska. The second in command
(SIC) had been employed by Hageland for 2.5 months. He was hired with 189 hours, and at the

68

time of the accident, he had accumulated 84 hours in the C208B for a new total time of 274
hours. The PIC had been issued a certificate for CFIT avoidance; however, there was no record
that the SIC had completed any simulator CFIT training. In conversations with his girlfriend, the
SIC expressed that flying for Hageland was like “‘the wild west,’ flying in low visibility and
below minimums” (NTSB, 2018, p. 6).
Meteorological Information
The closest weather station was located at Togiak Airport (PATG). About the time of the
accident, at 1156 AKST, the automated station was reporting calm wind, 7 mi visibility, light
rain, scattered clouds at 3,900 ft, overcast clouds at 4700 ft, and a temperature/dew point spread
of 7/6 °C. The weather station was approximately 10 NM southwest of the accident site.
Additionally, weather camera photographs from the time of the accident showed mostly
obscured terrain approximately 7 mi away (NTSB, 2018).
The second flight crew changed course due to weather. Before they diverted, “[their]
route and altitude were similar to those of the accident flight. . . . The accident flight crew had
likely passed, about five minutes earlier, the location where the second crew chose to divert”
(NTSB, 2018, p. 42). After realizing the accident flight may have likely crashed, the second
aircraft departed PATG, yet were unable to locate the aircraft due to clouds obscuring the
mountains along the route. They reached the site within 1 hour of the accident (NTSB, 2018).
Aircraft Information
The aircraft, a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, is a popular model for cargo and passenger
flights in rural Alaska. At the time of the accident, there were no open minimum equipment list
items aside from the aircraft’s ADS-B system (NTSB, 2018). The accident aircraft was GPScapable and equipped with a multi-function (MFD) that provided a variety of data to the pilot.
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The aircraft was also equipped with a ground proximity warning system and a terrain awareness
and warning system (TAWS). One display choice on the MFD was a map feature, which used
color to differentiate between water and terrain. This page would display terrain in shades green,
brown, or blue. Yellow or red would be displayed if terrain was 1,000 or 100 ft below the
aircraft, respectively. When using this feature, a terrain inset would appear in the corner of the
display to notify the pilot of any ‘red’ terrain within a 5 NM radius of the aircraft. On different
display options, an advisory flag would illuminate and flash in the corner of the display for 10
seconds when the aircraft was within 100 ft or 2 minutes of any terrain or obstacle (NTSB,
2018).
The TAWS, which was independent of the MFD system, had an internal GPS and terrain
database. The TAWS was a look-ahead system (forward-looking terrain avoidance), which
enabled it to look at lateral and vertical flight paths. This system had an en route required terrain
clearance of 700 ft AGL. Below this altitude, the system would alert the pilot unless the aircraft
was within a local airport area. The accident aircraft flew the majority of the route between 500
and 700 ft AGL, within the cautionary range of the TAWS. Caution messages (aural and visual)
would begin 1 minute from impact with terrain or an obstacle (“CAUTION TERRAIN”), and
warning messages (aural and visual) would begin 30 seconds from impact (“TERRAIN,
TERRAIN, PULL UP”; NTSB, 2018).
Because the TAWS and ground proximity warning system were separate, no TAWS
warnings were displayed on the MFD. Instead, a smaller display was installed as part of the
TAWS at the top of the dash. This display included amber and red visual alerts to the pilots and
featured a TAWS inhibit switch. When selected, aural and visual alerts were inhibited from
alerting the pilot of any possible terrain conflicts. This would stay inhibited until the pilot
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deselected the TAWS inhibit switch. White text “TERR INHB” was backlit to display the
selection of the switch (NTSB, 2018).
Organizational Information
Hageland, d/b/a Ravn Connect, was certified as a Part 135 operator who provided
scheduled and on-demand charters around the State of Alaska. They employed 120 pilots and
operated 56 aircraft (NTSB, 2018). Typical to many Alaska Part 135 operators, Hageland’s pilots
worked a 2 weeks on, 2 weeks off schedule and were based across the state. Pilot housing was
provided. Each pilot had around a 14-hour duty day.
The accident aircraft, the Cessna 208B, was certified for single-pilot operations and its
checklist was approved accordingly. When flying single-pilot, an 8-hour flight time limit was
imposed. With the addition of a second in command (SIC) or safety pilot, the company was
approved to extend the flight time limit to 10 hours. This was common practice at Hageland, as it
allowed for better schedule utilization. The SICs were expected to act as crewmembers during
flight and help to offload passengers and cargo (NTSB, 2018).
Per Hageland’s operation specifications, pilots were authorized to fly special VFR when
visibility was 2 miles or greater and ceilings were at or above 600 ft. VFR flights were common;
pilots were limited to fly no lower than 500 ft AGL, and per the company GOM, were expected
to fly the shortest safe route to the destination airport. During the investigative hearing on the
accident, the chief pilot discussed how the IFR infrastructure in Alaska did not support
Hageland’s operations. She noted that IFR approaches were available; however, they were
unable to be used due to the lack of weather reporting stations across the state (NTSB, 2018).
Flying at altitudes lower than 1,000 ft was habitual and oftentimes necessary when weather
precluded pilots from flying higher (NTSB, 2018).
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At the time of the accident, Hageland did not have a formal SMS. Their GOM described
procedures for reporting safety events, which included a list of mandatory reports. Reports could
be submitted anonymously through a web-based reporting system, or a company hotline, both of
which were managed by the Medallion Foundation. Following the accident, the DO was asked to
describe the safety culture at Hageland:
I would say that the safety culture at Hageland is—it is—I believe we are still in a
reactive phase of safety culture, but we’re moving towards a proactive phase and the
employees are actively participating in the safety program. They don’t in my experience
cover things up that are safety issues. They would rather identify them and get them
repaired. So, I would say in general the safety culture is very healthy. (NTSB, 2018, p.
29)
Training
Training on crew resource management (CRM) techniques was required by company
manuals. These computer-based training modules were part of initial and recurrent training at
Hageland. Their focus was to enhance communication among crew members to promote better
decision-making. The training defined PIC duties for the captains and “follower” duties for the
SICs, which included monitoring, supporting, and respecting the leader (NTSB, 2018, p. 18).
There was no documented training material that described pilot flying versus pilot monitoring
duties (NTSB, 2018).
Though not required by Part 135 regulations, Hageland provided CFIT training to their
pilots in initial and recurrent ground school using a simulator and classroom lessons. Hageland
used Medallion Foundation resources to create their training program and were participants in
the Shield Program. The CFIT avoidance training was not included in the company training
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manuals and thus was not subject to FAA oversight. There was no record that the SIC on the
accident flight had completed the simulator CFIT avoidance lesson. The training in the
computer-based training module was taken from a Flight Safety Foundation training aid
published in 1995—it was outdated for operations with GPS. Additionally, the training was not
tailored to Hageland’s operations (NTSB, 2018).
The Hageland operating manuals had no instruction for the use of the TAWS inhibit
switch. During the investigative hearing following the accident, the chief pilot stated that pilots
were authorized to inhibit TAWS when flying in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and
when they were able to see terrain conflicts. Pilots were not authorized to use the terrain inhibit
during flight in IMC conditions (NTSB, 2018). Company policy allowed pilots to fly as low as
500 ft AGL, an altitude below the alert limits of the TAWS (700 ft AGL). Due to this, pilots
frequently inhibited the TAWS on VFR flights to reduce nuisance alerts.
The SIC of the second flight described how they had TAWS inhibited to remove nuisance
alerts for portions of their flight. She could not specifically remember when they uninhibited the
TAWS (NTSB, 2018). The company had no procedure or checklist item regarding the use of the
TAWS inhibit switch; different company pilots had different techniques for its use. When asked
how hard it was to ignore the terrain inhibit annunciator, the chief pilot described the location as
prominent in the pilot’s scan—the white light was very bright and difficult to ignore (NTSB,
2018).
Operational Control
The DO was responsible for operational control. He had the ability to delegate
operational control to approved persons described in company Operation Specifications
(OpsSpecs) and operation manuals. Operational control agents (OCAs) and approved pilots
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could have joint operational control. Flights could be released with concurrence between both.
Each flight (which could consist of multiple legs) went through a risk assessment before
dispatch. The pilot and OCA would look at elements like weather, terrain, VFR versus IFR,
maintenance deferrals, and so on, to determine a risk number for the flight. Anything above Risk
3 required management approval. Risk Level 4 prohibited dispatch (NTSB, 2018). OCAs would
contact pilots periodically throughout flights to update them on weather. Due to terrain and
communication infrastructure, the OCAs would frequently relay messages through the departure
control agent (DCA; i.e., local station agents), and at times, the DCA would relay that message
through another pilot to finally reach the intended aircraft. The DCAs and OCAs were in
frequent contact as weather, passenger counts, cargo loads, and departure times changed
throughout the day (NTSB, 2018).
On the day of the accident flight, the OCA suggested the flight depart on an IFR flight
plan. The PIC discussed the weather with the OCA, and they ultimately determined operating
under VFR would be appropriate for weather conditions and meet regulatory and operational
limitations. The flight departed Risk 2 due to inoperative ADS-B equipment. During the flight,
the OCA did not contact the accident crew, as there were no further weather updates.
The OCA was responsible for monitoring the progress of the flight and notifying the DO
or his delegate if the aircraft exceeded its estimated arrival time. On the day of the accident, the
operational control center was not aware of the late arrival despite Spidertracks position not
updating for 20 minutes. They were first notified when the DO received a call from the Air Force
Rescue Coordination Center notifying him of the emergency locator transmitter signal (NTSB,
2018).
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Hageland Safety History
During the period between 3 December 2012 and 8 April 2014, Hageland had five
accidents and one runway excursion:
1. 3 December 2012: forced landing following lost engine power.
2. 4 March 2013: runway excursion attributed to the crew’s attempt to land in IMC with
excessive crosswinds and tailwind.
3. 4 May 2013: CFIT under VFR with a single pilot.
4. 22 November 2013: a touchdown short of the runway in IMC conditions while operating
VFR.
5. 29 November 2013: VFR into IMC, CFIT. Pilot and three passengers were killed, six
more were seriously injured.
6. 8 April 2014: fatal accident during training event, both crew members killed. (NTSB,
2018, p.31)
Between the various accidents listed above, Hageland’s principal operations inspector
and the FAA sent various safety requests to Hageland. Following the 4 March 2013 event, the
principal operations inspector requested that flights not be released in adverse weather. His letter
questioned the ability for persons with operational control to oversee such a large operation and
whether flight crew training was appropriate. (NTSB, 2018).
After the 4 May 2013 accident, the FAA met with Hageland to discuss their risk
assessment tool and requested follow-up documentation on their progress later that summer.
After the 29 November 2013 accident, the FAA suspended the training program for
approximately 1 month and outlined requirements to regain approval to restart training. Lastly,
after the fatal accident on 8 April 2014, the NTSB issued an urgent safety recommendation,
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indicating “that the recommended action required immediate action to avoid an imminent loss
from a similar accident” (NTSB, 2018, p. 32).
The NTSB recommendations asked the FAA to conduct an audit of multiple facets of
Hageland’s operation, among them maintenance, training, and operational control. The team
performing this audit was to be from outside Alaska. In addition, a separate audit of FAA
oversight was to be performed, also with investigators from outside Alaska.
Both NTSB safety recommendations were eventually closed with acceptable actions. The
FAA evaluated key components of Hageland’s operation and issued corrective actions following
the audit. None of their resolutions involved pilot training, and the FAA noted, “The training
program design meets all the requirements of . . . Part 135, but only the minimum for approval”
(NTSB, 2018, p. 33). In regard to FAA oversight, a new certificate management office was
established in the Alaska region to provide additional oversight of large Part 135 carriers (NTSB,
2018).
Findings and Analysis
Following this accident, the NTSB conducted an investigative hearing to gather data from
key witnesses and personnel in Hageland’s organization. The 1-day event highlighted topics such
as operational control, pilot training related to weather, and safety management conditions
relevant to the Alaskan environment as a whole (NTSB, 2017). In conjunction with the
investigation completed by NTSB investigators on scene, the hearing gathered factual evidence
used in the final report.
An emphasis on the PIC’s decision to continue VFR into IMC and his failure to attempt
an escape maneuver, the company’s inadequate training program on CFIT and CRM, the
unmonitored use of the TAWS inhibit switch, and poor FAA oversight of Hageland’s operations
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were factors in the final NTSB report (NTSB, 2018). The NTSB determined the probable cause
of the accident was:
The flight crew’s decision to continue the visual flight rules flight into
deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver
after entry into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled
flight into terrain (CFIT). Contributing to the accident were (1) Hageland’s
allowance of routine use of the terrain inhibit switch for inhibiting the terrain
awareness and warning system alerts and inadequate guidance for uninhibiting the
alerts, which reduced the margin of safety, particularly in deteriorating visibility;
(2) Hageland’s inadequate CRM training; (3) the Federal Aviation
Administration’s failure to ensure that Hageland’s approved CRM training
contained all the required elements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
135.330; and (4) Hageland’s CFIT-avoidance ground training, which was not
tailored to the company’s operations and did not address current CFIT-avoidance
technologies. (NTSB, 2018, p. xi)
Recommendations made following the accident can be found in Appendix E of this study.

Table 2
Themes From Togiak CFIT Accident
Case study

Theme 1

Theme 2

Togiak
CFIT

Inadequate
training

Company
culture

Theme 3
Inappropriate
use of
equipment
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Theme 4
Inadequate
safety
programs

Theme 5
Operational
control

Ketchikan Midair
On 19 May 2019, two float-equipped aircraft collided midair near Ketchikan, Alaska.
Both aircraft, a DHC-2 (Beaver) and a DHC-3 (Otter), had been conducting sightseeing flights
near a waterfall in Misty Fjords National Monument, approximately 8 NM northeast of
Ketchikan. The DHC-2 was destroyed in the collision and the pilot and all four passengers were
killed. The DHC-3 sustained substantial damage, the pilot had minor injuries, 9 passengers had
serious injuries, and one passenger was killed. Both aircraft were operating under visual flight
rules in VMC conditions at the time of the accident (NTSB, 2021).
ADS-B data provided by the FAA shows the flight paths of both aircraft starting at
approximately 1213 local time. As the aircraft converged on the waterfall, the DHC-3 descended
from an altitude of 4,000 ft, while the DHC-2 began a climb from 3,175 ft. The DHC-2 stopped
its climb at 3,350 ft on a 255-degree track. The DHC-3 continued its descent on a 210-degree
track until the two aircraft collided at 3,350 ft at 1221:14 local time (NTSB, 2021). Figure 20
shows the flight paths of aircraft with time and altitude stamps depicted.
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Figure 20
Aircraft Flight Paths Including Time and Altitude Stamps

Note. (NTSB, 2021).

Wreckage from the DHC-2 was found on land and in the water near the collision site.
Mechanical cuts from the propellor of the DHC-3 tracked inboard from a position midway on the
right wing, which was completely separated from the aircraft at the wreckage site. The occupants
of the DHC-2 were ejected from the aircraft during the collision.
The DHC-3 sustained substantial damage from the collision and subsequent impact with
the water. The floats separated from the aircraft during the crash landing. The propellor of the
DHC-3 showed severe rotational gouging, consistent with the wreckage from the DHC-2. The
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portion of the aircraft forward of the main passenger cabin (including the cockpit and firewall
forward) was mostly separated from the fuselage. Both portions remained mostly intact (NTSB,
2021).
After impacting the water, the pilot of the DHC-3 was able to swim out of the wreckage
and help 9 out of 10 passengers through the rear aircraft door. The tenth passenger, who was
sitting in the co-pilot seat, was slumped over the pilot seat with her seatbelt fastened. Her cause
of death was blunt force trauma. Drowning was a contributing factor to her death. Despite a
thorough briefing by the pilot on the use and location of the life vests, only one passenger took
theirs during the evacuation. The surviving passengers were towed to shore by a passing good
Samaritan and taken to the hospital by the U.S. Coast Guard (NTSB, 2021). Figure 21 shows the
DHC-2 wing recovered from the accident showing mechanical cuts.
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Figure 21
DHC-2 Wing Recovered From Accident Site Shows Mechanical Cuts

Note. (NTSB, 2021).

Operator Information
The DHC-2 was operated by Mountain Air Service, LLC under Part 135 on-demand
regulations. They provided flightseeing tours for the Ketchikan area. The pilot was the owner
and sole pilot for the company. The NTSB found no airman qualifications or personal factors to
be causal factors in this accident (NTSB, 2021). The pilot had flown for numerous operators in
Alaska and had accumulated approximately 11,000 hours of flight time.
The DHC-3 was registered to Pantechnicon Aviation, LTD out of Minden, NV, and
operated by Venture Travel, LLC, d/b/a Taquan Air. The flight operated under Part 135 on81

demand regulations and also flew tours. The pilot had been flying with Taquan since summer
2018 and passed his PIC checkride earlier in 2019. He accumulated over 25,000 hours, 15,000 of
which were as PIC (NTSB, 2021).
At the time of the accident, neither company had a formal SMS. Taquan’s management
started the process for SMS approval, stating that they wanted to give their customers the highest
level of confidence in their business (NTSB, 2021). The NTSB has continually recommended to
the FAA that SMS become mandatory for passenger-carrying Part 135 operators. Currently,
SMS is optional (NTSB, 2021).
Aircraft Information
The DHC-2 was compliant with all FAA-required inspections—aircraft condition was not
a factor in this accident (NTSB, 2021). The DHC-2 had an ADS-B in-and-out system in its
avionics package. The system had three components (a transceiver, controller, and Wi-Fi
interfacing device), which worked to provide ADS-B information to the pilot via an iPad
equipped with ForeFlight™. The iPad was mounted in the center of the panel below the power
levers/controls and could display a moving map.
The ForeFlight™ application generated visual and aural traffic alerts to the pilot. Traffic
targets were displayed as a filled, cyan triangle. When a traffic target became a traffic alert
(within 1.8 NM and +/- 1200 ft), the triangle became yellow, and a pop-up alert displayed the
direction, distance, and altitude of the target. Aural alerts could be transmitted through the pilot’s
headset (if connected via Bluetooth) or through the iPad speaker.
Similarly, the NTSB found no outstanding maintenance issues with the DHC-3 aircraft.
The DHC-3 was equipped with the same ADS-B transceiver as the DHC-2. To provide altitude
information to the transceiver, the associated Garmin control panel must be selected “ON” via
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the control knob and selected to the “ALT” mode. Two Chelton EFISs comprised the primary
flight display and MFD of the DHC-3.
The Chelton EFIS worked with the ADS-B transceiver to provide traffic information to
the pilot on the EFIS displays. The EFIS displays were located centrally in front of the pilot seat,
and the Garmin control panel was located on the right-hand side of the cockpit, in front of the copilot seat. Though the Chelton EFIS had the capability to display traffic alerts, the ADS-B
transceiver could not provide alerts, and the DHC-3 did not have the capabilities to provide its
pilot with aural or visual warnings.
Findings and Analysis
The aircraft were operating under VFR in VMC conditions. Clear skies below 12,000 ft
and visibility of 10 NM was reported at PAKT. The pilots were relying primarily on the “seeand-avoid” concept. A cockpit visibility study created using passenger photos, aircraft
specifications, and sun angles was conducted by the NTSB to determine the feasibility of either
pilot sighting the other aircraft before impact. It was determined that, due to the flight path of the
DHC-2 and the structure of the cockpit, the pilot “would not have had the opportunity to see the
DHC-3 (which was above and behind his aircraft), by visually scanning the outside
environment” (NTSB, 2021).
The pilot of the DHC-3 had the opportunity to see the DHC-2 for approximately 1 minute
20 seconds prior to impact. However, the relative size of the aircraft would have been “about one
sixth the height of a thumbnail held at arm’s length” (NTSB, 2021, p. 18). The size would have
gradually increased as the aircraft got nearer; however, the majority of the DHC-2 would have
been concealed by the window post up until impact.
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This accident highlights inefficiencies in see-and-avoid techniques. The NTSB concluded
that “collision geometry, obscuration by aircraft structures, and limitations of human
performance can make it difficult to see nearby aircraft,” (NTSB, 2021, p. 34).
Following the accident, both ADS-B systems were removed from the aircraft and sent to
their manufacturer for testing. The system in the DHC-2 was operational; however, the system
from the DHC-3 sustained substantial damage from the accident and could not be analyzed.
ADS-B data from the FAA showed both ADS-B transceivers were on and transmitting data to
the nearest ground stations. Data from the DHC-3, however, was missing pressure altitude and a
valid transponder code. The last time the aircraft had transmitted this data was 29 April 2019.
This information indicated that the Garmin control head was in the “OFF” position, thus
preventing the information from being transmitted out to other aircraft (NTSB, 2021).
The pilot of the DHC-3 was not aware that the Garmin control head was in the “OFF”
position. His pre-flight routine was to leave the control in the last position; he assumed that
turning it would disable the avionics equipment. He stated that the display appeared functional
and that he could see other aircraft on his display during the accident flight.
As part of the analysis for this accident, the NTSB used ADS-B data to simulate various
traffic information displayed prior to the collision. For the DHC-3, the DHC-2 would have
appeared as a filled cyan triangle. It would have been displayed approximately 4 minutes prior to
impact and remained there until the collision. Simulations were compared to a DO-317-B
compliant device. This requirement specifies the aural warning, color, and shape of traffic
symbols on the cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). On this display, the DHC-2 target
would have changed to a yellow symbol and been accompanied with an aural alert describing the
location of the traffic (NTSB, 2021).
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Three simulations were made for the DHC-2. The most likely scenario assumed pressure
altitude reporting from the DHC-3 was turned off. In this case, the traffic symbol for the DHC-3
would have appeared as a filled cyan triangle on a converging course. However, no aural or
visual alerts would have been provided due to the lack of altitude information from the DHC-3.
This simulation assumed the “hide distant traffic” function was turned off; had it been enabled,
the DHC-3 would not have appeared on the DHC-2 iPad at all.
The second simulation assumed the DHC-3 was broadcasting pressure altitude
information. In this case, the ForeFlight simulation would have shown the DHC-3 as a yellow
symbol. Accompanying aural traffic alerts would have sounded, starting from 1 minute 44
seconds until impact. The final simulation was with a CDTI device compliant with DO-317B and
assumed the DHC-3 was broadcasting pressure altitude. In this scenario, the DHC-3 would have
appeared 1 minute 44 seconds before impact as a cyan arrowhead. It would have changed to a
yellow arrowhead 35 seconds prior to impact and come with an accompanying aural alert. An
additional aural alert would have sounded 29 seconds prior to impact (NTSB, 2021).
The NTSB has underscored limitations on see-and-avoid in previous accidents and
emphasized the reliability of CDTI devices in preventing midair collisions (NTSB, 2021).
Because there were no aural alerts, effectiveness of the CDTI devices relied on the pilots
incorporating their respective devices into their instrument scan. Due to the limitations on human
performance when under high workload (i.e., navigating the visual environment), their visual
scan was ineffective in preventing this accident (NTSB, 2021).
In high-traffic tour areas, a CDTI with aural and visual alerting systems can draw
attention to possible traffic conflicts when the pilot is under high visual workload. When used as
part of the normal scan, the CDTI brings more general awareness to the location of other aircraft.
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Frequent monitoring increases situational awareness of the pilot. Clarity on the CDTI display can
help pilots to quickly find traffic visually, which enhances see-and-avoid techniques. A welldesigned electronic interface is a valuable tool in high-traffic, high-workload areas, especially
when operating single-pilot.
Probable Cause
The NTSB determined the probable cause of this accident to be:
The inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which prevented the two pilots
from seeing the other airplane before the collision, and the absence of visual and aural
alerts from both airplanes’ traffic display systems, while operating in a geographic area
with a high concentration of air tour activity. Contributing to the accident were (1) the
Federal Aviation Administration’s provision of new transceivers that lacked alerting
capability to Capstone Program operators without adequately mitigating the increased
risk associated with the consequent loss of the previously available alerting capability and
(2) the absence of a requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting
among operators who carry passengers for hire. (NTSB, 2021, p. 49)
Recommendations made following this accident can be found in Appendix E of this study.

Table 3
Themes From Ketchikan Midair Accident
Case study

Theme 1

Theme 2

Theme 3

Ketchikan
midair

Inappropriate
use of
equipment

Inadequate
safety
programs

External
environment
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NTSB Accident Data
A brief content analysis of NTSB accident data is included in this section. The accidents
from the 10-year range from 2008 to 2018 were analyzed to determine how contributing factors
to accidents correlate to case study themes, interview data, and participant feelings toward air
safety in Alaska. The data included all Part 135 airplane accidents in the date range. Accidents
were excluded if the final results were not yet published, findings were undetermined, or where
there was missing information.
The data was classified using accident severity. Per the NTSB definitions, a fatal accident
is one where death occurs within 30 days of the accident. Serious accidents are those which
include:
hospitalization more than 48 hours commencing within 7 days after the
accident, fractured bones (excluding fingers and toes), severe
hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage, involves any internal
organ, or involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burn covering
more than 5% of the body. (NTSB, Definitions, 2010)
As part of the content analysis, descriptive statistics of contributing factors referenced in the
accident reports (percentage) are highlighted in Table 4. Most accidents have multiple
contributing factors and the most impactful are listed.
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Table 4
NTSB Accident Data: Part 135 Accidents in Alaska, 2008–2018

Number of accidents
Age (mean)
Experience (mean hours)
ATP
Commercial
Crew

Fatal
20
41
7,769
40%
60%
20%

Serious
16
51
10,930
75%
25%
0%

Minor
26
43
6,089
35%
65%
12%

None
104
47
10,307
52%
48%
8%

65%
20%
0%

56%
13%
6%

38%
27%
19%

23%
30%
10%

20%
0%
30%
35%
15%
25%
5%
15%
0%
0%
0%

6%
0%
13%
6%
0%
38%
13%
31%
13%
19%
0%

12%
4%
0%
4%
0%
27%
15%
0%
27%
15%
0%

12%
10%
1%
10%
0%
5%
17%
0%
35%
20%
10%

Contributing factors
PI-Decision-making/judgement
PI-Aircraft control
PI-Lack/delay/incorrect of action
PI-Situation
awareness/orientation/recognition
PI-Complacency
ORG-Oversight
ORG-Policy/procedures
ORG-Safety/pressures/demands
EI-Weather (ceilings/visibility/icing)
EI-Weather (wind/gusts/turbulence)
EI-Terrain
EI-Runway/landing environment
MX
Other

Participant Interviews
A qualitative interview analysis was the main research instrument for this study. Themes
and information gathered from the case study review and NTSB accident data analysis showed
areas where further qualitative analysis was required to further explain the psychosocial and
organizational influences on Part 135 pilot decision-making. The content analysis helped guide
the development of interview questions to assess the viewpoints of eight different Part 135 pilots
in Alaska.
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Participants were interviewed in a semi-structured format. The main objective during the
interviews was to create an environment where each participant felt at ease sharing their
unfiltered opinions on their careers in the state. Participants had a variety of experience ranging
from over 20 years and 13,000 hours operating in Alaska, to a first job as a commercial pilot
with 350 hours of total flight time. This diversity of experience was invaluable during the
research process. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of research participants’ age,
experiences, highest pilot certifications, and interview length.

Table 5
Participant Data

Participant
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Mean

Age
22
57
28
26
29
39
40
34
34.4

Years of
experience
1
7.5
3
3.5
10
6
20
15
8.25

Alaska
hours
350
5,000
1,600
5,300
5,000
4,000
13,000
10,000

Highest
certificate
Commercial
ATP
Commercial
Commercial
ATP
ATP
ATP
ATP

5,531

Interview
length
57:01:00
48:11:00
48:28:00
61:08:00
57:22:00
65:12:00
64:36:00
67:31:00
58:41:08

The semi-structured interviews were manually transcribed and edited to remove any
identifying information such as company name, tail numbers, and so on, and then condensed to
remove technical recording glitches and speech tics (e.g., “Can you still hear me? How about
now?” “Ummm, yeah, so…”). Manual deductive coding was used to categorize the interview
data to find themes and patterns recurring between the eight interviews. The researcher used
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deductive thinking to check the themes against participant data (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The
following section describes six themes that emerged from the research data.
Pilot Relationships
As one of the main focuses of this study, interpersonal relationships between pilot peers
was a critical element explored during the interviews and its importance was evident during data
analysis. Numerous codes were identified in the data across all eight interviews. The importance
of interpersonal relationships for Part 135 pilots is recurring in other themes, such as skill
enhancement and organizational factors. Table 6 shows the prevalence of the associated codes
among the interviews as a percentage of the interviews in which the themes emerged (i.e.,
coverage).

Table 6
Theme 1: Pilot Relationships
Code
Camaraderie

Cockpit relationship (CRM)

Peer pressure

Description
Developing friendships, trust
between colleagues, mutual
respect of others’
boundaries/decision-making,
team dynamics
Relationship between a
captain and a first officer,
cockpit relationship
dynamics, superior/inferior
power balance
Positive or negative influence
on decision-making

Coverage
75%

87.5%

50%

Participants discussed the importance of CRM even in companies that fly single-pilot.
Local knowledge, which entails sharing information unique to the operational environment, is
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important for their decision-making, especially as weather and runway conditions can change
rapidly. Likewise, the dynamic of crewed cockpits changes the experience of a flight. The two
quotes below highlight the importance of CRM in both single-pilot and two-pilot operations,
respectively:
I made a lot of really good friends and a lot of these guys. . . . We rely on
each other. Whoever goes in there first, we’re relying on a PIREP [pilot report]
from those guys. We also make decisions together. There are a few pilots I
legitimately trust. We’d be talking on the radio on the way down to who knows
where, all these little, tiny villages, which may or may not have an approach.
We’re discussing the different options based upon the weather and everything we
saw this morning or the morning of the flight. Try to figure out what the best way
was to try and get in there. Talking to each other is huge. But then there are other
pilots that I never ask an opinion of.
I really love the attitude where you’re a team. It’s not, I mean it is a
captain and an FO [first officer], but I feel for me like it’s more of a team. I had
some captains like that and that was amazing. And then I had some captains that
were like “I am the captain, you’re just a warm body in the seat” and I know how
that made me feel.
Participants discussed the importance of being able to work together outside of the
cockpit. The unique working environment in Alaska often means that pilots are on shifts together
in pilot housing, typically in remote parts of the state. In situations where these respondents work
together, eat together, share a living space, and spend their free time together, the respondents
highlighted the importance of having compatible personalities to minimize conflicts. A
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respondent with 20 years and approximately 13,000 hours of experience flying in Alaska
explained the importance of being able to fit in with peers in a pilot community:
In bush Alaska in 135 operations, the nature of working with and around the same people
all the time. . . . You either fit into the team or you don’t last. People, this is a harsh thing
to say, but the people who can’t get along in that circumstance and who can’t contribute,
they get run off.
The results suggest that the relationships pilots form with their peers influences their
decision-making and highlights the role of peer pressure and group effects. While some
participants perceived positive influences of peer pressure (i.e., encouraging safe decisionmaking and canceling flights when appropriate), others stated that the behaviors of their peers
negatively pressure pilots to fly outside of their comfort zone. The dynamic of pilot bases in rural
Alaska contributes to elements of peer pressure, and the following quote provides an example of
when newer, inexperienced pilots may have been influenced to fly outside of their limits due to
peer pressure stemming from operationally experienced pilots:
I think one of the things I’ve seen that’s problematic in places that I go that have larger
pilot bases was a classic example where we had 14 pilots on shift. We had some really
experienced pilots and then we had people that were on their first commercial job. It
seemed like one person was making the decision for that whole base that it’s flyable.
“We’re good everybody. Everybody to your planes.” Whereas after, I went where there
was one [Aircraft Type A] driver, one [Aircraft Type B] driver. I was paired up with a
really experienced driver and I was a fairly new commercial driver, but that was better
because I didn’t feel the pressure of these other drivers all running to their planes.
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Participants indicated that the best bush pilots are the ones who are able to stick to their
own personal limitations with regard to off-airport operations and flying in marginal or windy
weather conditions. A respondent with 20 years of experience emphasized that safety in Part 135
flying often depends on the manual flying skills of the pilot, their ability to interpret their
environment (e.g., a float pilot needs to read the water), and their willingness to gradually
expand their flying skills by incrementally increasing the challenge level of their operations.
Another participant discussed two accidents in which they thought the pilot had pushed outside
of his personal limitations due to influences from other pilots. Negative peer pressure in this
environment is often subconscious:
You have to have understand risk management, you have to understand your own
limitations and you have to be willing to stand up for your limitations. Don’t be
pushed into something. It’s one thing to expand your knowledge base and to work
on your craft but it’s another thing to go beyond what you feel is safe just because
someone else feels it’s safe.
Pilot Attitudes
During the interviews, five respondents, each with more than 6 years of operational
experiences flying in Alaska, opined that individual personality attributes had an overall impact
on interpersonal relationships among Part 135 pilots. The participants further suggested that, as
part of individual attitudes and interpersonal relationships, some pilots misconstrued ego and
confidence, which had adverse effects on personal risk tolerance in their community. Table 7
shows codes and emergent themes associated with these opinions on pilot attitudes.
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Table 7
Theme 2: Pilot Attitudes
Code
Ego

Confidence
Risk tolerance

Description
Sense of self-importance,
boastfulness, comparison
against other pilots
Comfort in skills, self-pride,
self-assurance
Pilot’s willingness to accept
risk, to accomplish dangerous
tasks

Coverage
87.5

87.5
87.5

The affective construct of ego was mentioned by almost all of the respondents (87.5%) as
an attitudinal trait acquired naturally by Part 135 pilots who fly in the bush environment. The
results from the interviews also suggested that some current Part 135 pilots displayed behavioral
tendencies of overconfidence in their flying abilities:
The pilot is required to have an attitude of “I want to broaden my horizons, I want to
push my boundaries.” But then a cockiness or an overconfidence or a feeling that I can
do anything is taking that too far and that can have disastrous results as well.
Seven out of 8 pilots interviewed discussed an element of ego negatively affecting
relationships with their coworkers, some even mentioning how their own ego has evolved with
experience. The quote below depicts one participant’s views on how pilots “proving themselves”
can be manifested as ego:
There’s a part of it that’s just pilot ego. Each one of us has a touch of that if we’re
honest with ourselves. The longer I fly the less I feel like I have. The more you
know, the more you realize you don’t know.
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Participants note that ego most frequently manifested when discussing events that had
happened out flying, or during episodes of hangar talk. Participants contrast these pilots with
those who share experiences to provide cautionary tales. One participant elucidates the
difference between sharing stories to boost themselves and sharing experiences to better inform
the pilot group:
Stories are kind of like an ego boost. Bragging, “This is the weather I flew in VFR
today, you’ll never believe this,” “This is how much ice I built up on this flight I
couldn’t believe it.” Then the sharing experiences is more like, “Hey, you know I
had this failure today, this type of system failure,” or “I had this happen on
touchdown,” or “This mountain at a certain airport causes this type of wind
pattern to come over so watch it when you go in there, I haven’t seen it before.”
Participants recognized that, for every pilot who displayed self-serving egotistical
tendencies, there were twice as many who used their learned experiences to teach or mentor. A
respondent candidly explained the reaction of most pilots in their community to the issue of
pilots with at-risk egotistical tendencies:
I’d say it’s positive. It’s not a dick measuring contest. . . . There’s people like that,
but they get run off. People just kind of say, “Hey watch out for this guy” or
“Whatever, he’s a blowhard.” The vast majority of those stories it’s . . . we don’t
want to have to see someone else learn the hard way.
Participants suggest that the most frequently recurring quality of bush pilots is risk
tolerance. Most participants emphasized that, to be successful as a pilot, one must have
commensurate risk tolerance for flight missions. Respondents further stated that playing it “too
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safe” is unrealistic and that flying regardless of consequence can result in disaster. These are
some relevant quotes to buttress their opinions:
Unfortunately, if you wait for huge margins or everything, you’re not going to
make it work half the time.
He was the epitome of a cowboy. He was the extreme edge of that. I don’t think
most people fall on the extremes one way or the other. He was the exact . . . like when you
heard that he had run into the side of the mountain in bad weather it was like, “It was
only a matter of time.”
As stated earlier by a respondent with almost 8 years of flight experience in Alaska, most
pilots are neither prohibitively risk averse nor dangerously accepting of flights. Rather, they fall
somewhere in the middle. Finding the balance between playing it unnecessarily safe and taking
all flights regardless of internal and external risk factors is critical to being successful. Most
participants reiterated that pilots must display professionalism and good judgement by assessing
their flying skills (manual and cognitive) with the limitations posed by variables such as weather,
aviation infrastructure, and aircraft capabilities. Consequently, this means that sometimes a
particular pilot would be more appropriate for a flight. This could be due to experience or skill.
For example, one pilot discussed an interaction he had with a colleague:
It’s crazy to me to hear people who go in there day in and day out versus people
who still go in there a fair amount—how their approach to it is different. When
I’m hearing these things and weighing “how comfortable am I with this airport?”
it really makes you think. I’ve turned down a few flights in the Southeast that
maybe someone else wouldn’t have. Not because he could do it any safer than I
could, but he just knew something a little more what to expect. So that’s an
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interesting point, and I think that’s true in a lot of different places in Alaska. If
people are comfortable going into that place, they’re accepting of that flight.
Skill Enhancement
There were many components of skill enhancement discussed by participants. The codes
generated touch on internal development, external relationships between coworkers, and formal
training provided by the organization. Skill enhancement was mentioned by all eight participants
to varying degrees. The associated codes are listed in Table 8.

Table 8
Theme 3: Skill Enhancement
Code
AK experience

Mentorship

Pilot development training

Skill enhancement

Description
Experience specific to flying
in Alaska. Much like
“instrument time” refers to
time spend with reference to
the flight instruments, “AK
time” references time flown
in the state of Alaska.
The relationship between a
pilot and a mentor, especially
someone respected in the
company or the aviation
industry
Company-provided training;
professional development
provided by the organization.
Could include ground school,
computer-based training,
initial operating experience
(IOE), training on the flight
line.
An individual’s outlook
toward training and
improving, personal
growth/career development,
attitudes required to learn
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Coverage
100%

62.5%

62.5%

50%

All eight participants discussed how the methods by which pilots gain experience
operating in Alaska are crucial to their safety as pilots in the state. The reasons cited for this
include the vast diversity of terrain, extreme weather, and the intensity of flying in Alaska. It was
common to hear participants discuss how important experience was to being successful. One
participant described how they were able to gain experience and provided insight for best
practices to train pilots new to Alaska:
Experience is the only thing that is truly going to make a bush pilot. You come up
here and, no matter how good a stick you are, there’s nothing that can really
prepare you for everything that Alaska is going to throw at you until you
experience it. That’s why I think having mentors, having people who you can
actually fly along with before you get thrown into the deep end by yourself is so
crucial. There are many, many instances where I just learned from trial and
error, or I experienced things by myself for the first time.
Three participants, each with over 3 years flying in Alaska, discussed how unqualified
they felt when they were hired. Another, who was raised in Alaska, discussed how elements of
Alaska that were natural to them, for example the remoteness of the state, were obstacles to
overcome during training for their peers. See one participant’s retroactive view on this matter:
Looking back on my starting years, I really had no business flying in Alaska,
coming in from the Midwest doing long flat flights to nice airports with nice
lighting. But I had a lot of multi-time, and that’s the only reason I got hired up in
Alaska. . . . I really had no expectation for what I was getting into, and the
experience is definitely a must. I’ve seen that kind of bite people at some
established companies.
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For a pilot to maintain a positive safety record, respondents opined that they must be
honest about their prior flight experience and willing to learn new skills (e.g., manual flying and
decision-making techniques) commonly used in Alaska. Management’s approach to hiring
should take prior flight experience into consideration. A pilot with no previous experience flying
in Alaska should not be expected to perform the same tasks as a pilot who has previous Alaska
experience until they develop skills relevant to the Alaskan environment and the operation.
These pilots need to be weaned onto the flight line incrementally, gradually getting exposure to
new and more challenging operations.
I was a general opinion from most participants that this strategy of incremental exposure
helps build confidence, which makes the pilots safer and self-aware. Two participants, one with
20 and one with 6 years of experience, stated that actions management can take include increased
time on initial operating experience (IOE), pairing new first officers (FOs) with experienced
captains, gradually giving more challenging flights to the pilot, and reviewing safety hazards
associated with the operation. Critically, the approach an organization takes to building
experience is instrumental to avoiding incidents and accidents. The following is a quote to
highlight the points of participants:
If you take a brand new pilot, and you send them on one of the most challenging
operations, it’s almost a guarantee that they’re going to wreck the airplane. Maybe not
on that one, but if that’s your operational philosophy, that any pilot can do anything that
we have regardless of if they’re brand new or they’ve been there forever . . . I’ll just
restate what I’ve said before, I’ve seen that result in a lot of accidents up here.
Participants discussed how attitude is a great predisposition for learning operational
skills. Alaska is challenging and unique, and a thirst for new knowledge is how a pilot will learn.
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Five participants were unanimous that satisfaction with mediocrity and an unwillingness to
further improve skills and knowledge may be operationally detrimental to pilots and detracts
from their ability to form camaraderie with other pilots. A willingness to want to learn more and
become more skilled was the only way to actually improve. The quote below highlights the
concerns stated earlier:
You have to be willing to listen to other people and gain experience slowly and
methodically, but also push your boundaries.
Equally important was learning from the experience of other pilots. Participants were
asked about hangar talk and the attitudes surrounding how pilots share stories. The concept of
mentorship repeatedly emerged during participant interviews. When asked about the type of pilot
that participants most respect, four participants described pilots who were keen to share their
experience for the purpose of teaching and who shared mistakes and lessons learned. This was a
valuable method of gaining knowledge through the experience of others.
One interviewee was just starting their career and emphasized how impactful the
openness and honesty of their captains and more experienced coworkers was in building their
comfort in their position. Positive hangar talk sessions were a powerful tool for creating
camaraderie among pilots, learning from second-hand experience, and building confidence.
Each participant that spoke about mentorship had a specific pilot in mind who gave them
valuable insights into bush flying. A core attribute was that their mentors would share all
experiences, even those that were embarrassing or unsafe, for the purpose of teaching their
mentee. There was no formal mentorship program available to any of the participants, rather a
natural bond formed between pilots who were keen to pass on knowledge.
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As participants gained experience of their own, they needed the advice of others less and
began to share their own experiences with the younger generation of pilots. In the opinions of the
interviewees, this mentorship cycle helps change the social culture of bush pilots. The attitudes
gradually start to shift and encourage camaraderie and openness about safety critical events that
can be shared for learning instead of showboating. One participant who has been flying in Alaska
for 15 years summed up their experience with mentorship:
I think for us up here there’s a lot of respect for the people that have experience
operating up here. You hear someone’s story, and you hear their experience and you’re
like, “Oh yeah I wouldn’t have thought of that before . . . ” They either reiterate what you
already knew or cause you to think in a way that you probably hadn’t thought before. . . .
In general, there’s kind of a wealth of knowledge that’s open and available. I’d say from
[the beginning] to where I am now it’s slowly decreased just because the need has
decreased. Now I feel like I find myself on the other end of the spectrum, sharing
knowledge that you’ve learned either from other mentors or from firsthand experiences
or mistakes.
Five of the participants discussed their company training. In general, these participants
emphasized that on-the-job training was more valuable than classroom training and checkride
preparation. Part 135 training is required to cover items like aircraft systems, company
procedures, operations specifications, and contains a flight-related portion where new hires learn
how the company operates their aircraft. Until the training is put into practice, it is often difficult
to see how to connect all the elements. One participant working their first job as a commercial
pilot had recently completed training and described their experience:
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My training wasn’t very involved. The checkride wasn’t very involved. I don’t
know if this is common in Part 135 operations. It’s kind of like the checkride was
the first training flight. “Here’s how you do this and you’re ready for the test and
now you start learning.” They kind of throw you into it. . . . Other than that most
of the training and the flying all happens on the clock, so to speak.
All eight participants discussed how local knowledge enhanced their decision-making
abilities and described it as “hugely, hugely important,” and “invaluable.” Two participants
discussed how they felt gathering local knowledge was more relevant than classroom study and
company procedure. Local knowledge includes elements like runway conditions, frequency dead
spots, and weather patterns. This information could be important to making go or no-go
decisions and was more frequently referenced than the information from ground school. The
length of time flying in Alaska exposed pilots to a variety of situations and allowed them to
slowly build their local knowledge. Two participants discussed the relevance of local knowledge:
So much of what we do here, so many of the landings and takeoffs that we
do here are really at your own risk. You don’t have a government entity saying
that, “Yeah this landing surface is good, you can take that to the bank.” That
doesn’t exist on a river, that doesn’t exist on a pond someplace . . . or in a remote
region of Alaska. That’s a huge part of the aeronautical decision-making. If I’ve
never been there before I’m going to talk to somebody who has.
I think it’s invaluable. It sets you up to be ahead of the game. You know
what to expect, you know what’s coming, and you know what to look out for
versus just blasting off and not knowing and then getting caught off guard. So I
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think, especially operating in Alaska, you need to have as many tricks in your
back pocket as possible and hopefully you don’t run out of them in the process.
Infrastructure Limitations
A theme that was frequently mentioned in participant interviews was the numerous
infrastructure limitations and their impact on operations, specifically regarding safety of flights
in Alaska. Participants mentioned a need for self-reliance with the absence of services and in the
abundance of intense flying scenarios encountered in Alaska. Table 9 shows the themes
associated with the infrastructure limitations in Alaska.

Table 9
Theme 4: Infrastructure Limitations
Code
Lack of services

Flying intensity

Self-reliance

Description
IFR infrastructure, navigation
aids, communication with
ATC, NOTAMs, reliability of
weather reporting, weather
cameras, in-flight services
Extreme weather, varied
terrain, difficulty with
communication, aircraft
condition, etc.
Necessity to gather own
information, make decisions
without the help of dispatch,
company, etc. Formulate own
plans, survive in harsh
environments

Coverage
87.5%

87.5%

75%

One of the most common elements discussed among participants was a lack of
infrastructure across the state. This ranged from navigational aids, instrument approaches,
weather reporting stations, and airport condition reports, to sparse radio communication and
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radar coverage with air traffic control. For many operators to fly legally under the IFR system,
each component needs to be working properly for pilots to dispatch. For example, an airport
might have an instrument approach procedure for available runways but no weather reporting
system on the airport.
Many airports rely on neighboring airports to provide weather information. If weather
conditions at the time of the flight require the pilot to fly an instrument approach to land, the
crew must be provided with or have access to an accurate and timely weather report provided by
the neighboring airport as published on the approach procedure to legally initiate the approach.
Participants explained what often happens in the circumstance where an airport doesn’t have a
certified approach procedure.
Pilots will fly an approach to a proximal airport other than their destination, and once
clear of the weather, cancel their IFR flight plan and continue VFR (scud run) underneath the
cloud layer by following visual landmarks to their intended destination. A participant described a
technique where pilots create their own approach when the destination airport doesn’t have one
and weather is below VFR minimums:
Basically direct-enter-enter, fly the synthetic vision on their screen, build
themselves an approach as they fly the video game all the way down to the
runway.
Part 135 operators also operate extensively under VFR rules. Participants say the FAA
weather camera project has been instrumental in providing reliable, real-time weather to pilots.
They are able to see what is happening, play back the camera loops, and make decisions based
on that information. These cameras are strategically placed in high traffic areas or areas where
there are no other weather reporting capabilities.
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A broken camera, or a mountain pass or route with no camera at all can be dangerous for
operators to fly through. One participant discusses a near miss they had with another aircraft
while flying through a mountain pass in marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions, that is,
weather that doesn’t necessitate an IFR flight plan but has lower ceiling and visibility
requirements than VFR:
I was going to follow a certain river to the lodge. I was hearing reports of [the weather]
being better past [redacted] Lodge. I don’t remember how far I was from it and [the
visibility] just kept getting worse and worse and I’m talking to these guys who are on the
other side, and they say it’s perfectly good. It got down to, we’ll just say really low. And
it was just after that I was a little bit farther and I saw this 185 on amphibs emerge out of
this cloud right in front of me, right above me. I was like, “50 to 75 ft different that could
have been the end of it. We’re turning around right now.” And that was an eye opener.
But you know it’s one of those things where your mind wants you to think that you’re fine,
you’ll pass through it, you’re talking to guys on the other side of it. Then reality hits
where it’s like, “We’re right here, we’re right now, this is the situation.” It doesn’t
matter what it is 5 mi ahead; if you can’t make it another mile, none of it matters.
Three participants discussed how sometimes the options are to bend the rules or not fly at
all; this attitude has remained relatively constant through the career of those participants. Three
different pilots noticed a positive trend away from this behavior. These were the three
participants with the longest experience in Alaska (20, 15, and 10 years). They noted that more
regulatory oversight and improvements to IFR infrastructure and weather reporting have
contributed to the positive trend. Despite this, participants emphasized that there is still a need
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for further infrastructure development (e.g., more usable approaches, widespread weather
reporting systems, and better radar coverage were discussed).
The limitations of the IFR system are augmented by limitations of the air traffic
management system which is composed of aircraft and weather radar, aerodrome and local
airport area controls, and may include resources like flight following and surveillance. Large
swaths of Alaska are not in radar coverage, and even more limiting, not under radio
communication. Participants highlight that it is not uncommon to experience severe challenges
when contacting air traffic control to get or cancel a clearance. Participants say using techniques
like departing VFR or receiving a through clearance to multiple airports are common and
essential to function in the limited IFR environment. One participant discussed operational
obstacles to flying in Alaska:
From learning how to land, to getting in and out legally with the IFR system’s
deficiencies. You can’t just file IFR. What do you do when you get to mins and
can’t contact Center? Or your airplane is iced up and the boots don’t work. If you
land and are covered in ice, what are you going to do? Chip it off? There is no
equipment.
Operators rely on good information to make safe decisions regarding where they can
land. In the absence of this information, pilots are forced to make decisions in the blind.
Participants spoke about unreliable information regarding runway conditions. In smaller
communities, local tradespeople are hired to do runway maintenance and inspections.
Inappropriate equipment for snow clearing, grating, and runway servicing, means that runways
are often unusable. One participant discussed the lengths they go to get any information
regarding airport conditions:
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I would say probably half of the places we go it’s pretty unreliable. There are
only some airports up here that are attended at all hours of the night and DOT is
out there plowing or looking at the runway conditions. So sometimes we’re lucky
that they go out and do that and let us know if there’s birds on the runway, or
snow on the runway, or ice, and what it looks like to them before we land. There’s
a lot of places that we go that we don’t get that information. And at least a lot of
the people that accept our cargo, and some of the radio people . . . she can’t tell
us exactly what the conditions are, but she can tell us if she has had to scrape off
her car window because it was frosty or if she had a foot of snow on her car or
not.
Participants say that challenging infrastructure is only part of what makes flying in
Alaska difficult; the geography and weather patterns of the state itself are factors to contend
with. Each participant shared stories that stood out to them regarding weather or terrain. One
summed up their experience flying:
I think as a pilot you should already be ready for anything to happen. It’s almost more
extreme here. You have to be ready for everything here, if that makes sense. How many
things could go wrong that could kill you, and it happens very often here. I think a lot
more often than it does happen down south. It seems like there’s an endless list of things
that I need to be concerned about up here. I’m still learning and I’m still adding things to
that list every day. We have so many things that could cause problems, like the weather
and terrain, you know, mud on the runway, landing out in the bush, in the villages.
Participants mention that self-reliance is critical to having a safe and incident-free career.
With minimal services in the bush, pilots need to think ahead of every variable and be able to
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operate without support. The lack of services compounds this, and as participants have said,
some information like runway reports or airport notices to airmen (NOTAMs) may not be up to
date or trustworthy. The participants further highlighted the importance of local knowledge by
intimating that it provides insights into the intricacies of specific locales and best practices for
operation. Respondents suggest that pilots learn this information by discussing flights with peers,
forming mentorship and camaraderie-like relationships, and by gaining experience slowly and
methodically. The intensity of flying in Alaska requires pilots to be extra mindful about many
things pilots in the lower 48 contiguous states of the United States may take for granted, like
access to shelter and basic facilities. A quote highlighting a participant’s perspectives on selfreliance is provided below:
There are extremes even before you get in the air you’re having to think about. What do
you have on you? Where are you going to go, who are you going to talk to? I’ve never
thought before I came up to Alaska that I would be shooting approaches to airports
without talking to people. I had no concept of that. It truly is a unique place because the
pilot has to think through everything of their day. Not just the flight and getting on the
ground but after I get on the ground. How do I keep us warm? How do I keep us going?
How do I get a hold of somebody to cancel flight plan, tell them we made it? All sorts of
strange things.
Organizational Factors
Organizational factors emerged as a theme discussed by all eight participants. The
emergent codes were on management relationships, competition, and efficiency (see Table 10).
These codes highlighted organizational impact on employees’ attitudes and factors that influence
pilot decision-making.
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Table 10
Theme 5: Organizational Factors
Code
Management

Competition

Efficiency

Description
Interactions with
management, attitudes
surrounding operating
principles, managerial
culture, managementemployee relationships
Competition between
companies or among
employees
Completing tasks on-time,
meeting customer demands,
scheduling demands, duty
days

Coverage
75%

37.5%

100%

Only two participants had strong negative opinions about the leadership at their company.
Overall, 75% of pilots interviewed said they had a good relationship with management. They felt
management was generally easy to reach out to and supported the pilots’ decision-making.
Interpersonally, the relationships were good, and participants liked their supervisors. Despite
this, participants also indicated that management would emphasize the need to get the job done
and assign pilots to flights who were more likely to bend rules. This was stressed by one
participant, who said:
Unfortunately, management knows some guys are willing to do anything to get in no
matter the weather. If I go missed, they’ll just send someone else.
Some participants felt that management needed to play a more active role in daily
operations. Managers were out of touch with the type and amount of work that employees were
being asked to do. One of the interviewees suggested that management personnel occasionally
ride-along on normal revenue flights. They would then see the high physical demand of
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loading/unloading cargo and the fatigue that accompanies multi-leg days. High pilot turnover in
some companies could be avoided if pay and hours were increased and decreased respectively. A
quote from an interviewee confirmed this:
I think we need to start saying, “I’m sorry, I can’t do that.” If people flew with us,
they would say, “Wow.” If they had to do it, they would think differently. If they
compensated people, they would stay longer. People come here to get experience
and leave.
Five participants discussed the prevalence of company efficiency. Pilots understand that,
in order for the company to make money, they need to be flying. This push to fly is one factor
that could lead to poor or rushed decision-making. According to the experiences of participants,
personnel like management, other pilots, passengers, and representatives in the outstations would
push for flights to depart. One participant noted that passengers and station representatives are
pushy about flying:
Sometimes communities expect too much out of pilots as far as why they’re not
flying or getting in. There are base managers who aren’t pilots who expect you to
work miracles.
Another highlighted how this affects their decision-making:
Thinking, “Hey, this is Alaska, we’re still trying to get flights done.” That has
pushed me more out of safety than anything else. “Know the rules, but know
we’re trying to get it done.” That has happened, pushing you to do something.
I’ve seen it a lot.
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Despite pressures from company personnel to complete flying, one participant
highlighted the dichotomy between efficiency and safety and discussed how pilots are ultimately
in control of finding that balance. Read their comments below:
The number one priority is to get the job done, but not at the compromise of
safety. In 135, your job is to get the job done, and the responsibility of making all the
decisions falls on the pilot. Ultimately you can say no.
Flying in Alaska requires creativity. If your default is ‘no’ when asked to get a job
done, you won’t be successful up here. The default answer needs to be, ‘Let me try to
figure out a solution.’
Participants recognized that company reputation is important, yet underscored the effects
external time-related pressures have on creating a culture where pilots fly at all costs. This goes
hand in hand with competition between companies. If one company is flying, there is more
pressure for the other local operators to be flying, too. Participants noted that this pressure exists,
but the individual pilots at other companies are keen to share advice and information about
weather and runway conditions. In other words, competition doesn’t withhold safety-critical
information. To sum up the relationship between competitors:
For the most part, everyone is looking out for each other.
Regulatory Oversight
A common theme emergent in the interviews with respondents was operating in the Part
135 environment within the bounds of regulation and company policies. Table 11 lists codes
associated with the theme.
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Table 11
Theme 6: Regulatory Oversight
Code
Legality

Oversight

Description
Regulations, rule-bending,
working within the 135
regulatory sphere
FAA oversight, safety
reporting

Coverage
87.5%

50%

A reoccurring theme among participants was the concept of decisions that are safe and
decisions that are legal. Participants stated that the inadequate IFR infrastructure (e.g.,
navigational aids, weather reporting systems, radar coverage) may limit safety when pilots are
forced to make decisions that are safe but not necessarily legal.
Working with infrastructure deficiencies requires creativity to accomplish both, and
today there are circumstances where the pilot needs to choose one option. The legal option may
not be the most safe, efficient, or reliable. Participants who have flown in Alaska longest noted
that there has been improvement in this regard and reiterated that 20 years ago, safety-critical
flight decisions that were legally questionable were routine but today are less frequent. Despite
this improvement, even the newest participant noted the occasional blurred lines between task
completion and legality:
Sometimes you need to make decisions that are illegal to save you. That happens
a lot in Part 135. I think any pilot would choose that. Sometimes legal doesn’t
mean safe.
Company culture is important surrounding the “safe versus legal” conversation.
Participants said that safety reporting can be difficult when everyone knows everyone at smaller
companies. Anonymity is a luxury reserved for large pilot groups. Because of this, pilots are less
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likely to share information with management through their safety reporting systems. Pilots
talking among themselves and sharing local knowledge and stories was a more effective way to
create a good safety culture among the pilot group.
Within a minority of companies, participants say that their internal safety reporting
system consisted of a paper drop box in the break room, which was infrequently, if ever, used.
The best ways to share and disseminate information was to encourage openness among the pilot
group, share relevant information from management, and to establish non-punitive, anonymous
reporting systems. A participant buttressed this point with the following quote:
People are laissez faire and honest about what they share in hangar talk versus on the
record.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
This research sought to answer questions concerning factors affecting the decisionmaking of Part 135 pilots in Alaska. Many communities in Alaska are accessible only by air and
rely on the safety and efficiency of aviation to provide them with goods, services, and
transportation. The remoteness of the state, coupled with harsh terrain and weather, creates
challenges that aviators of large companies do not encounter. The accident rate has been
improving over the past few decades; however, recent high-profile accidents have highlighted
the continuing need for research on factors affecting Part 135 pilots.
This qualitative study used semi-structured interviews with current Part 135 pilots in
Alaska as its main instrument. They were asked questions regarding the attitudes on safety in
their peer groups, factors affecting their ability to complete flights, as well as to share any stories
that stuck out to them from their experiences. Six themes were identified as crucial to their
decision-making. These themes, along with important subthemes from the interview data, were
interrelated. The relationships are shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22
The Relationship Between External Themes and Internal Themes

Note. Author’s diagram. Outside ring = external themes. Inside ring = internal themes.

Three themes were identified that are considered external factors: organizational factors,
oversight, and infrastructure limitations. The remaining three, pilot attitude, pilot relationships,
and skill enhancement, are internal factors. During the analysis, strong links were drawn between
all six themes. Relationships were discussed at length by pilots in the interviews.
The participants discussed the importance of camaraderie among the pilot group, yet also
discussed how important it was for management (organizational factors) to understand each
pilot’s specific role and challenges of their environment. Relationships also included those
between a pilot and their mentor. Mentorship was the most commonly occurring method for skill
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enhancement. This was a surprising finding since mentorship had not been mentioned in
previous literature on Alaska pilots, yet was clearly important to the participants when they
discussed their social environment.
While mentorship was crucial to cultivate an environment of second-hand earning for
decision-making (hangar talk is an invaluable instrument), experience operating in Alaska and
working with the infrastructure limitations and regulatory hurdles was a necessary component to
being successful as a pilot in Alaska. Developing this skillset requires intentional practice and
gradually taking on more challenging flights, something management should carefully
encourage. Extensive discussions on the five research sub-questions developed to capture the
culture and limitations of working as a pilot in Alaska are provided in this section.
Research Question 1
What are the environmental and operational factors that make flight operations in Alaska
challenging for Part 135 pilots?
The findings show that there are numerous environmental factors that make flight
operations in Alaska challenging. The expansive geography, varied terrain, and differences
between regions of Alaska contribute to these factors. Weather, which can change quickly, often
limits pilots from completing flights. There are extreme swings in weather patterns between
seasons in Alaska that pilots are forced to contend with.
Weather specifically challenging in Alaska includes (a) areas of white-out conditions, (b)
large expenses of IMC, (c) long darkness in winter months, and (d) extreme cold temperatures.
NTSB accident data shows how low ceilings and visibility were more prevalent in serious and
fatal accidents than in accidents with no injuries. On the contrary, aircraft accidents with wind

116

patterns as a main causal factor seemed to be more associated with lesser severity in aircraft
occupant injury.
Airport facilities, information, and conditions make flight operations in Alaska
challenging. Most airports used by respondents are not required to adhere to Part 139
certification standards. Part 139 defines requirements for airports that serve scheduled passengerserving operations of more than nine seats or unscheduled operations configured with 31 or more
seats. These regulations set standards for (a) snow and ice removal; (b) airport rescue and
firefighting; (c) airport condition reporting; and (d) airport signs, markings, and lights; among
others. Alaskan airports are exempt when they only serve small air carriers with 30 or fewer
seats (Certification of Airports, 2013).
In some cases, information on runway status at Alaskan airports is difficult to obtain and
sometimes unavailable. In instances where pilots are landing off-airport, they rely on local
knowledge and their abilities to adequately read environmental conditions prior to landing. In the
event of an aircraft mechanical malfunction, maintenance services are difficult to find outside of
large city centers. It was interesting to note from the perspectives of the interviewees that many
airports they operated to or from lacked basic support services such as fuel, pilot rest facilities, or
shelter.
This basic lack of services support for flight operations at airports indicated that the
remoteness of Alaska contributed to specific job-related concerns for pilots and confirmed
findings of previous studies which suggested that reliable flight-related information may be
difficult to find in Alaska (FAA, 2021b). Participants intimated that initiatives such as the
weather camera project and Capstone program have contributed to decreasing the positive trends
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in the rates of accidents and incidents in Alaska. They, however, emphasized that accessing
reliable flight-related information is still a large hurdle in their decision-making.
Due to the varied nature of Part 135 operations, different types of aircraft equipment are
utilized frequently. Aircraft are often modified with skis, floats, or to withstand off-airport
landings. These types of operations require additional training and skillsets to safely complete
flights. Pilots are often drawn to the job due to the varied nature of operations and opportunity to
do this unique type of flying. In off-airport operations, there is no published information
regarding landing zone condition, weather, or services, since the pilots are working outside of
any airport environment.
Operationally, pilots work within a limited IFR system. Navigational aids, weather
reporting systems, and gaps in radar and communication coverage make operating in the IFR
system challenging. Pilots rely on these types of resources to safely fly IFR across the diverse
geographical regions of Alaska. Pilots often choose to fly VFR as a way to circumvent
limitations with weather reporting, IFR navigational aids, and approaches, despite marginal
weather conditions.
Research Question 2
What are the organizational factors that influence decision-making among Part 135
pilots in Alaska?
Findings from this study suggest that organizational factors have an impact on decisionmaking and have contributed to accidents in the State of Alaska. The interview data validates
results from extant research that pressures from management, like the needs to make money, to
build or maintain a reputation, and to be efficient, influence pilots (Bearman et al., 2009).
Participants suggest that, in addition to management, outstation representatives and passengers
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are often “pushy” and explicitly encourage pilots to make flights in marginal conditions. This
could be due to a general misunderstanding of the requirements to safely and legally complete
flights.
Despite the generally strong interpersonal relationships between pilots, findings from the
interviews show that managerial relationships need improvement. This could be due to a
disconnect between management and the pilot group on the reality of day-to-day operations. A
positive relationship between pilots and management allows pilots to make decisions in the best
interest of safety. Pilots are more likely to turn down flights in which they do not see a successful
outcome when management will back them. The influence of theoretical concepts like goal
seduction may be lessened when pilots have more support from management to delay or cancel
flights.
Mitigating strategies suggested by participants, such as ride-alongs by management to
observe the working environment of the pilot group, may help close this gap and create better
employee–employer relationships. Despite this, findings from participant interviews and themes
gathered from the accident case studies suggest that pilots are susceptible to foot-in-the-door
persuasion, as management occasionally selects specific pilots to make flights in marginal
conditions. Results highlight the continued importance of creating a work culture where a pilot’s
ability to turn down a flight is emphasized within a company.
The results from the case studies and the brief review of NTSB accident data in Alaska
indicate that there was a significant effect of organizational oversight on accident outcomes,
though it was surprising that this was not a significant finding from participant interviews. The
brief review of NTSB accident data shows that, of the fatal accidents, inadequate oversight or
inadequate policies and procedures were contributing factors in up to 30% of accidents.
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Causal factors gathered from the case studies presented in this study corroborate this data.
Despite efforts from programs like the Medallion Foundation to strengthen operational policy, it
was also interesting to note that interview participants valued the advice and knowledge gleaned
from mentors and pilot peers with almost equal importance.
Research Question 3
What are the psychosocial and cultural factors that influence decision-making among
Part 135 pilots in Alaska?
Findings show that relationships between pilots are influential in decision-making during
flight operations. Results from participant interviews suggest that psychosocial factors like
camaraderie may positively influence decision-making and contribute to a safety-centered
culture. Many companies in Alaska have small pilot groups or pilot bases where relationships
between crew members are developed. In these close-knit environments, it is natural that
relationships influence decision-making, which may be due to theories of modeled behavior from
concepts like social cognitive theory.
A stronger sense of camaraderie may lead to organizational change. Findings show that
these relationships are generally positive, and camaraderie and mentorship help to instill a safetypositive attitude. This is contrary to previous studies where interview participants suggested that
negative peer pressure was more influential on decision-making than camaraderie (Bearman et
al., 2009; Michalski & Bearman, 2014). Those pilots who either can’t get along or who don’t fit
in eventually leave. “Fit” within a peer group may be attributed to concepts from social identity
theory.
Mentorship was one of the most important factors when determining which group
constructs influence pilots. The utility of mentorship, as emphasized by participants in this study,
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is corroborated by research on the utility of mentorship in STEMM (science, technology,
education, mathematics, medicine) fields to developing confidence in skill and successful
navigation of work culture (Committee on Effective Mentoring in STEMM, 2019). However, a
study on the effects of mentorship for female Airline Transport Pilots did not yield results that
mentorship was significant to study participants’ feelings of success (Cline, 2017).
The unique environment of Part 135 aviation in Alaska may contribute to the differences
between these two studies. Regardless, mentorship is a significant part of Part 135 pilot culture
and may be successful due to its informal implementation. By creating an environment where
pilots learn from one another and use the advice of others, safety culture may improve and lead
to a reduction of incidents and accidents in the state.
The natural camaraderie that forms among pilots with similar positive safety mindsets
helps to instill a safety-conscious attitude in the pilot group. There are outliers within any group
of people and the general perception is that pilots who show up and do their job safely are mostly
respected. It was inferred from the interview responses that ego was not an admirable trait,
especially when it influences the safety of an organization, and that these characteristics were
becoming less prevalent in Part 135 operations in Alaska.
Research Question 4
How do prior experiences and generational/age differences affect decision-making
during operations among Part 135 pilots in Alaska?
The findings show that operational flying experience in Alaska was one of the most
influential qualities when determining the manual flying skill and risk tolerance of a pilot.
Findings also suggest that experience is paramount to quality decision-making. It is rather
interesting that, based on the opinions of the participants, it could be inferred that biological age
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had minimal impact on pilot decision-making compared to operational flight experiences in
Alaska. This could be due to exposure to different operational and environmental challenges like
weather, terrain, and mechanical malfunctions that may only be gathered from firsthand
experience. Sometimes participants may not have direct exposure to challenging situations but
will hear secondhand the advice and suggestions from colleagues who have.
Emphasizing the free flow of flight-related information using strategies like hangar talk
sessions and safety report dissemination may be particularly valuable for less experienced pilots.
These results were similar to findings from the literature that suggested observed behavior may
be as influential as firsthand experience in shaping decision-making, especially when considering
the strengthened effect of observing behavior with positive outcomes (Wood & Bandura, 1989).
Research Question 5
What is the perception of the safety culture among Part 135 pilots in Alaska and how
does it influence hazard identification and safety risk decisions?
The perception of safety culture among Part 135 pilots is generally positive. Findings
show that pilots are willing to share their operational experiences for the benefit of the larger
pilot group. SMSs may be difficult to implement in small organizations without proper
infrastructure and scaling (FAA, 2021b). The attitude toward these systems is positive; however,
findings show there are noticeable areas in which they can be improved.
Interview participants from small companies exposed challenges in implementing truly
anonymous reporting systems. One participant with experience in management suggested it is
difficult to have true anonymity when the pilot group is close-knit and small. Participants in
other companies described how they still use simple and non-online methods (pen and paper in a
drop-box) to gather safety reports and how these methods are not taken seriously. The Aviation
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Safety Action Program, which uses zero-fault incident reports to bolster safety programs, was
effective in a survey on Alaska aviation safety (FAA, 2021b). The general perception of these
programs is that they could be effective, yet participants reiterated the need for assurances that
they are non-punitive and will be treated anonymously.
Based on the opinions from the research participants it could be inferred that the
information passed or share between Part 135 pilots has more relevance to the day-to-day jobs
than information from their company top management personnel. This could be due to the
importance of casual mentorship relationships and strong camaraderie among these pilots.
Hangar talk and sharing local knowledge was more valuable for participants’ decision-making in
their opinions. The disconnect between the top management perspectives on operational safety
and pilot groups must be addressed to further develop a proactive safety culture among Alaskan
pilots and serve as a bedrock for any future SMS implementation.
Implications
In Alaska, flight operations support daily life and are critical to the Alaskan economy.
Findings from this study emphasize the importance of developing and sustaining a cadre of Part
135 pilots who can operate safely and efficiently within the Alaskan aviation environment. This
will also reduce the prevalent aviation accident rates in the state. The major themes from this
study highlight existing issues with infrastructure, oversight, and relationships between
organizations and their employees.
Experience was a large component in the effectiveness of aeronautical decision-making.
Findings from this study highlight the effectiveness of mentorship and could be used to create
programs in Part 135 operations in Alaska that pair experienced and safety-conscious pilots with
new pilots. This mentorship relationship can strengthen camaraderie, and overall social and
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safety culture within companies. Tapping into the experience of seasoned and safety-conscious
pilots and understanding their perspectives could help shape policy as it is implemented within
organizations.
Findings suggest that sharing safety-critical information is most effective in a casual
setting among some of the Part 135 operators. By understanding this, organizations can decide
how best to implement new safety measures, share critical information, and train their pilots for
the unique environment in which they fly. Further research on the effectiveness of hangar talk
and similar casual types of information sharing could be beneficial in influencing practices for
operators. The findings on the importance of local knowledge could guide FAA initiatives to
gather and disseminate this information through informal but widespread and accessible means.
A push for continuing infrastructure developments from local and federal sources that
address shortcomings in weather reporting, navigational aids, and radar coverage will help give
pilots options and provide information that may ultimately prevent accidents. The FAA Alaska
Aviation Safety Initiative Final Report, published in October 2021, underscored the need for
improvement to this infrastructure (FAA, 2021b). Continuing improvement, despite the
monetary challenges, is the most forthright change to improve safety in Alaska.
Limitations
A limitation was the possibility that information was withheld that could cause
embarrassment or loss-of-face due to social-desirability biases and self-serving biases on the part
of the participants. In an informal setting, most pilots are keen to engage in hangar talk and share
their experiences. The formal setting of the interviews may have contributed to feelings that
participants could not speak freely of their experiences due to these factors. To mitigate these
limitations, an emphasis on participant confidentiality was asserted and the researcher attempted
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to maintain a casual rapport with participants. The semi-structured format of the interviews
allowed pilots the opportunity to spend time discussing what they felt was most important to the
culture of Part 135 pilots in Alaska.
The scale and scope of Part 135 operations in Alaska is wide. Individual pilots an apply
for Part 135 operating certificates and organizations with hundreds of pilots also operate under
the same regulations. This study used a cross section of pilots from various Part 135 operations.
It is possible that further studies on small or large Part 135 companies will reveal more precise
and rich results for each subset of the Part 135 industry.
Another limitation is personal and expectation bias due to the researcher’s preconceived
notions and experiences as a Part 135 pilot in Alaska. The researcher’s research interests
stemmed from those experiences and the fatal accident involving multiple colleagues. The
researcher’s experiences were valuable in creating an environment during interviews where
participants could feel understood and relate to the interviewer. Interview data was audited by an
external reviewer and the researcher’s graduate researcher advisor to ensure potential elements
related to such personal biases were identified and objectively addressed. Member checking in
the form of allowing the participants to authenticate transcripts prior to final theming and
analysis was done to minimize potential biases and issues with trustworthiness.
Conclusion
This study was an ethnographic analysis of the psychosocial and organizational factors
that influence Part 135 pilot decision-making in Alaska. The study explored the perspectives of
eight Part 135 pilots who currently fly in Alaska using semi-structured interviews. NTSB
accident data from the period of 2008 to 2018 was used to corroborate findings from the
interviews, along with three case studies of recent fatal accidents in Alaska.
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Significant findings include themes from the semi-structured interviews that highlight
the importance of internal factors on pilot decision-making. These themes were (a) pilot
relationships, (b) pilot attitudes, and (c) skill enhancement. Results show that strong positive
relationships can be formed through mentorship, developing camaraderie, sharing experience,
and cultivating cockpit relationships, which contribute to the decision-making skills of pilots in
Alaska.
The theme related to pilot attitudes and culture suggested that bravado, daring, and risktaking used to be valued among Part 135 pilots in Alaska some 20 years ago. Currently, the
trends are shifting and to earn respect among peers, pilots must demonstrate desired attributes
such as honesty, humility, and openness. Findings also suggest that Part 135 pilots become more
safety-risk conscious and develop better ADM skills through advice from peers and their own
personal flight experiences.
The other major themes culled from pilot interviews emphasize the impactful external
factors affecting pilots in Alaska: (a) infrastructure limitations, (b) organizational factors
(including management relationships and efficiency), and (c) regulatory oversight. Infrastructure
limitations are reoccurring obstacles in Part 135 pilot decision-making. Pilot relationships with
top-level management would benefit from a more active role by managers in the day-to-day of
the employees. From a regulatory standpoint, results show pilots may sometimes be faced with
difficult decisions regarding legal options due to infrastructure limitations like inadequate
weather reporting and navigational tools.
This study adds to a paucity in existing literature on Part 135 pilots’ ADM during
operational activities in Alaska. This study also fills a gap in studies related to aviation safety
issues in Alaska. This study is timely for the Alaskan aviation sector as there have been some
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recent fatal accident despite a general downward aircraft accident rate. Findings from this study
may provide an empirical basis in formulating procedures that emphasize a safety-centered
approach to decision-making. From a regulatory standpoint, findings further illuminate the
viewpoints of essential stakeholders (pilots) on how the limitations posed by technically obsolete
or inadequate aviation infrastructure leads to regulatory violations and compromises operational
safety.
Further studies using a quantitative or mixed methods approach with a larger sample is
highly recommended to further understand how the challenges of psychosocial factors impact
decision-making among the diverse population of Part 135 pilots in Alaska. Longitudinal studies
with cohorts of Part 135 pilots in Alaska as they operate within that environment may be an
excellent empirical approach to holistically understand the interrelationships of the study
variables over time.
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APPENDIX C
Code Book Samples
Theme
Pilot
relationships

Code
Camaraderie

Camaraderie
Camaraderie

Camaraderie
Camaraderie

Camaraderie
Camaraderie
Camaraderie

Camaraderie

Camaraderie
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)

Participant quote
There are two of us and we have a connection and
camaraderie. We both know we want to fly and aren’t as
much as we want. We look out for each other. Their benefit
is my benefit. It’s nice to have someone who understands
me and my position.
My relationship with the captains and other pilots started
off a little awkward like any relationship.
Sharing experience and concerns invites validation. Trying
to do something as a group is more effective than as
individual.
We do things together after work. I have a gym routine with
the night pilot.
We try to learn from each other’s mistakes. I try not to
think, “It worked so it was a good plan.” I don’t want to
give the impression that everything was okay. Most of my
peers have similar mindset. Many peers have been safety
conscious pilots.
I tried to maintain a good relationship. A solid team is
essential.
Everyone was doing the same experience, so we’d talk
about that and spend time together.
We have meals together where we discuss how people are
feeling, what they’re looking forward to, projects. We study
for training together.
Humor is brought in. There’s lots of value in hangar talk
and telling stories. If you’re able to learn from other’s
experiences, you don’t have to learn everything on your
own the hard way
They do a good job picking people and personalities that
everyone is chill and laid back.
Sitting next to pilots and spending time with them you
ought to be comfortable in the environment. Initially that
can be uncomfortable because you don’t know how they
want you to do things.
People don’t like change, especially when two companies
merge. There is pushback, then people adjust to the new
norm and new people.
If I’m uncomfortable I’ll say something but mostly listen to
the captain. I trust the captains; they’re experienced and
excellent pilots. I have a lot to learn. I let the captain decide
at this point.
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Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Peer pressure

Peer pressure

Peer pressure
Peer pressure

In larger pilot bases we had experienced and brand-new
pilots. One person was making the decision for the whole
base.
He’s easy going but I can talk about things he did wrong or
could do better and he will take that information. He won’t
take it as gospel but will discuss it with me.
This is a thing with two pilot crews. “I’ve been here longer,
I know more, shut up, don’t tell me that,” when you try to
point out a legitimate concern. It COULD be an issue and
they’re aggressive. It might be a safety issue.
I look forward to the load sharing. I can potentially see
some conflict for decision-making. It sounds like there
aren’t a lot of issues with that.
If it’s a crew with different experience you should go off
the less experience. Often, it’s the other way.
You know he’s a put a lot of FOs in the plane and I feel like
nobody ever says no to him which is messed up. The sad
thing is the company knows what he’s doing but they’ll
never say anything to him
I love the attitude when you’re a team. It’s a captain and FO
but it’s more of a team. I had captains like that, and it was
amazing. Then I had some like, “I’m the captain, you’re just
a warm body in the seat.”
Being able to get along regardless if you like them or not,
pitching in and helping out when something needs to get
done regardless if it’s your job or not. Those things are
really important.
You have to understand risk management and your own
limitations and stand up for them. Don’t be pushed into
something. It’s one thing to expand your knowledge base
and work on your craft but it’s another to go beyond what
you feel is safe just because someone else feels it’s safe. I
think that’s common. People get pushed into things
It depends on the culture that is build into pilots by their
instructors. When I train someone, I drum in good culture.
I’ve tried to mentor a friend who was instructed by rule
bending pilots because he was doing the same. He’s still
pretty new.
There’s peer pressure stemming from getting the job done
and proving yourself as a new pilot
A pilot said no to something I would have done, and
management backed him up. He knew what others were
doing, even if it was outside the legal scope, and said no.
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Peer pressure

Peer pressure

Peer pressure

Pilot attitudes

Ego

Ego

Ego

Ego

Ego
Ego

Ego
Ego

Ego

Ego

Those are positive changes. A combination of peers and
company do the pushing.
Some people said no, some said they’d take a look, but
there was no disdain for people wo didn’t go. We’re good at
letting people make decisions and not making them feel
stupid. Company won’t fault us for not going because of
weather. I don’t think a lot of companies are like that.
Nobody wants to feel pressured with something they’re not
comfortable with. I’m like, “Oh, I’m going to do that and
show them I did that.” It’s personal pressure.
That’s scary and inappropriate for people to pressure
somebody to do something that they’re not comfortable
with
Competition for whose story is craziest. Might be more
common in men. Who can tell the best story? I think it
depends on the pilot.
At previous company certain people would be attracted to
the job who read somewhere what a bush pilot should look
like.
Some tell stories, others share experiences. Stories are an
ego boost. Bragging about what they did. Sharing
experiences is describing events that happened, warning
about it.
Part is just pilot ego, all of us have some. The longer I fly
the less I have. The more you know the more you realize
you don’t know. Proving themselves to the boss.
Some guys are proud for not having filed IFR in a year.
They go into places and laugh.
One guy told me he was flying in synthetic vision and broke
out at 80’ above the water with a plane of people. What an
idiot. He didn’t care about his certificate. Some guys are
belligerent and foolish.
To be safe you need to be honest about your experience.
I’ve seen chest-pumping “I’ve been here forever.”
The bad ones are reckless and push the envelope and lord
that over people. People who bend the rules. There are less
bad ones.
It’s a younger group, so we get full of ourselves because we
fly in bad weather and it’s exciting. “Oh my gosh, I just did
that, imagine all the other things I could go do.”
I’d say it’s positive, not a dick measuring contest. There’s
people like that but they get run off. People warn you about
them.
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Confidence

Confidence
Confidence

Confidence

Confidence

Risk tolerance

Risk tolerance

Risk tolerance

Risk tolerance
Risk tolerance
Risk tolerance
Risk tolerance

Risk tolerance

Pilots from the lower 48 can be overconfident because they
don’t know the areas as well. This is my first shift on the
north slope and I’m learning and relearning things.
Quiet professionals that do the things the books and movies
show. You’re not showcasing or bragging. It’s just your job.
Reputation is huge. If something bad happens to someone
with a good reputation, they will be protected. Everyone
talks, you need someone who is dependable to have a long
career.
I’ve learned that captains and chief pilots have all started at
zero. They are mostly helpful and mostly want to share
knowledge and make me feel comfortable. Many captains
are CFIs, so they like to teach.
With that comfort I’ve become a better pilot. If you’re
comfortable it’s a good learning environment. It’s safer
when you’re comfortable. Time is what causes comfort to
happen.
Depends on age and experience. Pilots who don’t skirt rules
get frustrated. They either stick around and are
uncomfortable always or they quit. I’ve seen pilots quit
because they think the operation is unsafe. It depends on
your tolerance and that’s particular in 135. Safety is
subjective. What one pilot can think is safe can be
horrifying for another.
Pilots that are willing to push past limitations. Comfort with
discomfort. Being willing to encounter dangerous situations
and accepting that its part of the job.
I have run into cowboys. A former colleague flew into a
mountain and killed himself, the FO, and a passenger. He
was the epitome of a cowboy, on the extreme edge. Most
people don’t fall on either extreme. When he crashed it was
like, “It was only a matter of time.” It’s becoming a less
desirable trait and isn’t seen as an asset. It’s not a good
thing anymore. People aren’t bragging about it. The
fatalities have contributed to that. Everyone in AK has a list
of friends or acquaintances that the know have died.
They know when to say no. I know some who say yes to
everything, and it may or may not have bit them.
Better to be safe than increase the risk and bend something.
I rarely turned around. I’m not saying it’s a good thing.
The more flying you do the less risk you want. The more
experience you have the more you realize what you don’t
know.
People are mostly realistic, but when it’s unrealistic and
people start backing it. . . . That happens less these days.

134

Skill
enhancement

Risk tolerance Now I’m like, “Oh, I can do that.” Not that I can, but
anything less isn’t bad. It makes you okay with the weather
that’s mild.
Risk tolerance It’s the ultimate barometer, if a guy has been flying in these
environments for years and he’s still alive he’s doing
something right. Then there’s guys pushing it, pushing it,
pushing it and it’s going to catch up.
AK
A pilot with Alaska time would be prioritized versus a pilot
experience
with the same hours but no AK time.
AK
experience
AK
experience

AK
experience

AK
experience

AK
experience

AK
experience

AK
experience
AK
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You don’t need experience to get hired but you’ll need to
learn more from your fellow pilots.
I didn’t know what I was doing when I first got here and
learned where I needed to improve. People will come up for
a month and want to fly their own plane. Sometimes they
get lucky, and nothing happens, other times they quickly
learn their deficiencies.
Apart from the grace of God, which I believe is the only
reason I’m alive, experience is the only thing that will make
a bush pilot. No matter how good of a stick you, you can’t
be prepared for everything Alaska throws at you until you
experience it.
I had no business flying here my early years. I got hired
because I had multi time. I had no expectations, and
experience is a must. It’s bitten people at established
companies.
The more experience the longer you’ll be successful. To be
safe you need to be honest about your experience. I’ve seen
chest-pumping, “I’ve been here forever.” Hours can be
derived as experience, years with a company, amount of
time going to a certain place. Age even. If you see an older
pilot, they obviously have experience. Mistakes can still
easily happen to experienced pilots.
More people are coming up with less experience. People are
retiring or moving out of state. They’re taking other jobs.
With the decrease in experience companies are increasing
their rigidity on safety factors.
It’s the most important thing. Can’t believe they let me be
an FO with 320 hours
I’ve seen a lot of accidents in AK where someone shows up
without AK experience and is treated like another pilot.
That’s the wrong way to run an operation in AK.
If that’s your operational philosophy, that any pilot can do
anything regardless if they’re brand new or they’ve been
there forever. . . . I’ve seen a lot of accidents.
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There are a lot of negative connotations of the seat of pants,
wing-it mentality. There are people who have years of
experience and learned the hard way and have operated
safely in those environments.
Starting out you don’t have the experience from the hard
way. There’s only so much experience you can pass on, the
rest you have to learn from yourself. I may be able to do it
and get away with it, but what you don’t know is almost
more dangerous. Knowing that you don’t know is more
dangerous than not knowing what you don’t know, until
you learn the hard way.
I appreciate honest people. We all make mistakes. If you
share knowledge a wise person learns from his mistakes, a
wiser person learns from other’s mistakes. Giving others the
ability to learn from your experience without almost killing
themselves is huge.
Having a passion for what you do—that’s the only way
you’re going to be 110%. To have passion, share it, and
share his passion with compassion. He invested himself in
his teaching and met everyone as an individual and learned
what they wanted out of aviation and taught them
accordingly.
With less experience the people who have been mentored
are mentoring others the same way.
People I flew with had experience, now I do and can pass it
on. You have to ask questions and be prepared.
I think that if the FO is not comfortable sometimes you
have to explain your decision-making and show them why
it’s okay. Show them resources they haven’t seen and that
we have the fuel. It’s a learning process but if someone is
not comfortable it’s a no-go. Not all captains have done
that.
If there’s questions or comments to be able to speak freely
and not feel judged. An environment where we’re learning
from each other. I like people who want to be there, learn,
and have a good time because we spend a lot of time
together. As a captain, when I fly with anybody new, I tell
them, anything you see, or want to know, just ask. I’m and
open book, I’m not going to get upset or passive aggressive.
Let’s have a good time and speak freely. If there’s anything
you need, let me know.
Someone with a positive attitude, who wants to be in the
plane and learn and teach. I’ve learned a lot from the people
I’ve flown with.
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I had a mentor, who I have tremendous respect for, who
knew how to get the job done in a way where you weren’t
going to get into trouble. There was a way to do it and it
required creativity.
I learned to fly a cub from a guy with 30,000+ hours. He
said, “You’ve got the skills and can fly like I do, but you
don’t have the experience to back it up.” It took me a while
to figure out what he meant.
There’s a lot of respect for people with experience. You
hear someone’s story and experience, and it brings different
things to your attention. They either reiterate what you
already know or cause you to think differently. It’s usually
constructive. Some people are constantly negative, others
are positive. In general, there’s a wealth of knowledge
that’s open and available. You are able to access that from
different people. From when I started to know that’s
decreased because I need it less. I find myself sharing
knowledge that I’ve learned. I’ve started to pass it along.
My training wasn’t very involved. The checkride wasn’t
very involved. I’m not sure if this is common in pt. 135.
The checkride felt like the first training flight. They throw
you into it. They ask the important questions like limitations
and memory items. Most of the training happens on the
clock.
On IOE you get exposure. My experience and training
never left me in the dark, but it doesn’t make sense until
you do a couple of runs
Other places weaned you on to the more difficult flights. It
gave you more rope than the more difficult flights—you
had to go with someone who had been there before.
We spend a lot of time on ride alongs. There’s regulatory
IOE but we will do more if we feel the pilot needs or wants
more. If someone isn’t spooling up fast enough there’s a
time where we’ll say it isn’t working out. It happens but we
need to be selective.
Once you get in the plane there’s more word of mouth,
nuances, and the operating environment which is more
valuable
There are people who are aware of what they don’t know.
Some start fixing that, others don’t.
You have to be willing to listen to other people and gain
experience slowly and methodically, but also push your
boundaries.
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The right way is to select routes or destinations for them
that are low threat. As they gain experience, as a manager
you’ll say, “This is more challenging, but they’ve been
doing really well and there haven’t been issues.” You have
to ease them into progressively more challenging
operations.
We talk about never being content with “good enough” as
an organization. We should always strive to do better. The
pilots should strive to do better, learn more, become more
effective, comfortable, and highly skilled. On the
management size the organization needs to strive to do
better. If either gets content that we’re doing good enough
we have a problem.
It was intense. The captain had to make big decisions on the
spot. I learned a lot. It was weird to be stuck on an island
with no services with nine people. You’re out in the middle
of nowhere.
An airport with an approach but no weather. We can’t
legally go there so we go VFR which is worse.
I hadn’t checked NOTAMs for that airport. NOTAMs
aren’t reliable because no professionals live in town. If
there is one, it’ll be old.
From learning how to land, to getting in and out legally
with the IFR system’s deficiencies. You can’t just file IFR.
What do you do when you get to mins and can’t contact
center? Or your airplanes iced up and the boots don’t work.
If you land and are covered in ice, what are you going to
do? Chip it off? There is no equipment
In 2001, there was a lot less infrastructure, less support, less
technology. But it’s a lot more challenging because the
weather forecasting isn’t as good, there’s not many places
to land, not much support.
The FAA is trying to keep up, there’s a lot that could be
done for infrastructure to support safety. AWOS, lighting,
approaches, those are starting to come to fruition.
People have bootlegged approaches, someone outside
attaches that stigma when it’s more than just having one
available. There’s more IFR infrastructure that needs to be
available to support that. We’re limited by the environment.
AK pilots are more used to ice, turbulence, terrain, flight
complications. This makes us more calm when it happens.
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You should be ready for anything to happen. It is more
extreme here. Many things could go wrong that could kill
you, and it happens often. There are endless things I need to
be concerned about up here. I’m still learning and adding
things to that list every day. There are so many things that
could cause problems: weather, terrain, runway conditions.
Every time I fly, I hear about an experience that could cause
serious damage. These things wouldn’t happen elsewhere.
There’s information that a non-local pilot wouldn’t
necessarily know that could cause questioning or panic.
There are situations that happen a lot in AK.
Lack of communications, places where you can’t get
information about landing, changing weather, size of state,
type of missions, ice, snow, winds.
If you wait for huge margins, you’re not going to make it
work half the time.
Aviation is crucial. It’s the only way in and out of these
places.
Flying a twin turbine while pretending it’s a super cub is a
dangerous job, it’s definitely a bush pilot.
The didn’t seem strange until I did 121 work with pilots
who don’t know Alaska. Then everything seems strange.
You explain normal procedures and people think its strange.
NDB approaches, center clearing you for approaches,
there’s no approach control. The whole aspect of flying in
AK is strange.
We fly when and where no one else is flying.
You need to think about what you’re doing and where
you’re going and keep yourself safe. Harsh conditions,
weather changes constantly and widely. It’s difficult. It
comes fast and you don’t know what to expect. There’s a lot
of no man’s land. Emergency landings are difficult. A
different animal. You learn fast.
Having grown up in Alaska I understand the state. A city
person would have no idea about the weather and terrain,
they’re sheltered. It would be scary for someone who has
never been in the wilderness.
So much of what we do here is at your own risk. You don’t
have a government entity saying that a landing surface is
good.
Alaska is a spectrum. You could fly in your own supercub
and land somewhere literally no one else has ever ben or fly
121 for Alaska Airlines. Everything withing that spectrum
has unique challenges. They’re different in those different
operating environments.
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That’s the biggest problem with my job. I haven’t been
trained as much as I should have been. Assumption is that
you train yourself outside of self study.
You learn how to take care of yourself. Even if not a
mechanic you have to know how to fix things. You have to
be ready for the unexpected. Weather changes quickly.
Things break quickly and badly. You need to know who
you can and can’t depend on. Not everyone is dependable to
their word. Off airport is challenging, it’s a different
mindset and skillset. Alaska IFR is different, it’s not only
GPS. There’s lots of ground-based navigation. You’re
required to be more self-sufficient.
No school will teach you what you need to know to survive.
It’s tribal knowledge.
If I get a call, it’s my job to decide if we can go legally,
weather wise, with the plane and crew, and if we have time.
All pilot operational control.
I’ve never had to go anywhere totally cold. Each place has
special local knowledge that can best be utilized. If you
didn’t know about the VFR traffic in Bethel, you’d never
have guessed it because there’s no information. You get
local knowledge from culture. I didn’t know anything about
some places until I started to go there.
In Alaska, pilots had the decisions on who, what, where,
how much. You’re the only person going to make today
happen, there is no ground crew. Not many people have
homed in on decision-making. They expect you to pick it up
along the way.
There’s no support. Where will you get fuel, stay warm.
I’ve had to heat up frozen airplanes. There are extremes
before you even get in the air. What do you have on you,
where are you going, who are you talking to? Through
clearances. Pilots have to think of everything throughout
their day. Not just the flight, but the ground time. Staying
warm, contacting center, etc.
They know when to cut out. It’s you and no support. You
and the mission. They think things through.
The pilot is more of a participant even though they may not
have the legal obligation for dispatching flights or for
making the plan. They will have a lot to say about how it
should get done and how they prefer to do it.
As a 135 pilot you have the most responsibility and risk.
You have the pressure to get the job done. You have to
weigh that with the operating environment, weather, and the
conditions.
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In 135 you do whatever it takes to get off the ground and
get flying. When your pay or career development (getting
hours) is dependent on taking off. . . . I used to sort mail—
the sooner it was sorted the sooner we could go. Jump in
and roll your sleeves up and do whatever needs to get done.
Safety in general, aviation aside, has gotten out of control.
There’s too much emphasis on being safe. It’s removing the
sense of self-preservation from the individual and placing it
on the company vs me using good judgement.
When safety trumps everything else, it’s more dangerous
than having self-preservation on the individual.
This chief pilot acts like he doesn’t understand why you
call. You need to remind him it’s policy.
I think its important that they fly. The less that happens, the
more people lose touch with day-to-day ops. It keeps them
involved and out with crews. They can see problems and
trends.
Management is on the pilots’ team vs the upper level’s
team. They have your back for decisions and safety.
I decided to quit my last job before the titanic sank
If I get somewhere and can’t get in, I’m going home.
Unfortunately, management knows some guys are willing to
do anything to get in no matter the weather. If I go missed,
they’ll just send someone else.
The more experience a pilot gets the more the company will
push them. The company says its up to the pilot, they can’t
force them to do anything, the pilots usually give in to
pressure from management.
Any hour of the day I can reach out. If it’s a new airport, or
I’m running out of duty, or an idea what I can do there is
someone higher up available.
It’s positive but I’m a white male and others don’t relate as
well to management. They don’t have the friendly rapport. I
was single through my career and could do extra shifts
which warms people. There’s a merit system to some of my
dealings with management—they like me.
I think we need to start saying, “I’m sorry I can’t do that.”
If people flew with us, they would say “wow.” If they had
to do it, they would think differently. If they compensated
people, they would stay longer. People come here to get
experience and leave.
It could be a place where people would stay if conditions
were better. It would save them money for them not to train
new people all the time.
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There’s advantages to a small operation. I personally have a
relationship with everyone. I know their skills and comfort.
I can choose the best pilot for a job. At a company with 50
or more employees, you can’t do that. That’s when these
things become more valuable. The advantages and
disadvantages to a small company are polar opposite.
Proving to the boss is the biggest thing, so they get more
time. It’s cutthroat.
Maybe nobody has been recently, and this is the cool thing
about Alaska, but you call your competitor and ask them. A
cultural thing in Alaska, for sharing information, parts, etc.,
companies that are fierce competitors help each other out.
You can call a competitor and ask their pilots, “Have you
been here recently?” The idea that they’d give bad
information, you don’t even consider it because it’s unheard
of. That’s really cool. When it comes to safety, even the
fiercest competitors help each other out. Nobody wants to
see any body else get hurt or down an airplane.
When I worked out west there were four main operators.
During the day you’re competing but at the end of the day
everyone is friends and talks. There are chitchat frequencies
where people talk. They look out for each other’s well
being. I’ve landed somewhere horrendous and told the guy
coming in that I wouldn’t do it again. Some guys puff up
their chest and do it anyway, and others take the advice. It’s
a whole spectrum of personalities. For the most part
everyone is looking out for each other.
When I first started, I thought it was weird to cancel IFR
with potential IMC. It’s to save time and be more efficient.
I was disappointed because we were on an active medevac,
and I don’t like not being able to complete the missions.
Aviation plays huge role in state and pilots are mostly
respected. Sometimes communities expect too much out of
pilots as far a why they’re not flying or getting in.
There are base managers who aren’t pilots who expect you
to work miracles.
The flight should be completed or not regardless of what
it’s for.
We’d go out to multiple villages in one day. The worst was
17 stops. Everything gets convoluted and fatigued with that
many legs. Loading the airplane is work, managing
passengers, picking up new freight.
Management wants to train pilots to be efficient regardless
of consequences. Management knows what’s going on, but
the boss isn’t out there every single day.
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We want to be in the safety envelope, not on the edge. This
was a new take for me. How can we get it done and stay in
the safety margin? They work with you on that.
Medevac wants to do things that are efficient and safe.
Sometimes that means saying no. That’s hard to do when
you’re saving lives. You want to make every flight happen.
Thinking, “Hey, this is Alaska, we’re still trying to get
flights done.” That has pushed me more out of safety than
anything else. “Know the rules but know we’re trying to get
it done.” That has happened, pushing you to do something.
I’ve seen it a lot.
Flights have to get done and things moved. The relationship
with the customer is important because they have a
reputation too.
If we want to fly, we’ll try to turn the plane fast, the way
we’re paid makes us unsafe. If we were getting
compensated, we’d be more safety conscious.
The mission statement of any 135 I’ve worked for is
“anything for a dollar.” We pick up anything in addition to
our core.
The seasonal pilots are in to earn their money in 4 or 5
months, and they might not work for the rest of the year.
They work hard, and can make really good money, but it’s a
lot of work for that period of time.
Flying in Alaska requires creativity. If your default is “no”
when asked to get a job done you won’t be successful up
here. The default answer needs to be, “Let me try to figure
out a solution.”
The number one priority is to get the job done, but not at the
compromise of safety. In 135 your job is to get the job
done, and the responsibility of making all the decisions falls
on the pilot. Ultimately you can say “no.”
Sometimes you need to make decisions that are illegal to
save you. That happens a lot in pt. 135. I think any pilot
would choose that. Sometimes legal doesn’t mean safe.
The regulations encourage the pilot to scud run or illegally
shoot the approach. What’s more dangerous? Scud running
or getting an approach from ATC?
May bend or tweak a policy in the interest of safety. That
happens daily depending on the company.
Mexican IFR is the easy way when you’re remote and there
aren’t approaches, they’re difficult to get, you don’t have
radar or communications. Otherwise, you have to shoot a
legal approach to an airport, bust out and cancel IFR, scud
run underneath VFR to the next village.
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If you’re taught that’s an okay way to fly . . . the owners
want the job done no matter the weather. If your first ridealong is breaking rules you think its normal. Anyone who
learns that way continues that way.
There’s a discrepancy between nonpunitive scenarios and
trying to be factual and document. When there is no union,
the pilot takes the blame. Even at this job if I made a
mistake and something went wrong it’s on me. It should be
on the pilots to mitigate risk as much as possible but even if
I made a perfect flight and something happened like a tire
blew and we went off the runway it’s on the pilot.
People are laissez faire and honest about what they share in
hangar talk versus on the record.
Sometimes there’s safe and legal and they don’t intersect. If
a field is IFR you might not get in with the approach. But
you could go from a different direction underneath where
it’s clear. That’s not legal but your hands are tied.
There are captains that we have because they were
cowboys. One has been along for a long time, flown in
Alaska for along time. He knows what he can do and the
terrain like the back of his hand. He’ll do an approach and
go lower than MDA and make it in. That’s not something
that I’m willing to do.
When I first came to Alaska you were often forced to
choose between doing what was safe and legal and they
were not the same. I would always happily be illegal but
safe.
Absolutely. Under a lot of circumstances because of
improvements in infrastructure you can be safe and legal.
Twenty years ago, you had to pick one. There’s still
circumstances where a pilot is forced to make that choice.
Company policy is what they show the FAA and new hires.
When its just dispatch, management and the pilots, tribal
knowledge supersedes policy.
Initially there wasn’t much oversight by the FAA, it was the
wild west. As long as you brought the plane back it was on
you. That freedom is good but it’s a Catch-22 with what
people choose to do with it.
There are FAA guidelines about reporting and our internal
system is stricter. We get many reports nationwide, not just
Alaska. Things that don’t apply to me. There will be
visibility If I report but there’s no good internal ranking
system. Everyone needs to talk about it, but it isn’t in
meetings. We get emails but no discussion.
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One big part is deidentification. With 12 pilots, everybody
knows everything. It’s a bigger challenge to implement at a
small company.
So many reportable things would be used against the pilots.
If the company had a system pilots wouldn’t be honest. I
wouldn’t go very far.
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APPENDIX D
Inter-Coder Reliability Sample

Data point
Competition for whose story is craziest. Might be
more common in men. Who can tell the best story? I
think it depends on the pilot.
If it’s a crew with different experience you should
go off the less experience. Often, it’s the other way.
People have bootlegged approaches, someone
outside attaches that stigma when it’s more than just
having one available. There’s more IFR
infrastructure that needs to be available to support
that. We’re limited by the environment.
Sharing experience and concerns invites validation.
Trying to do something as a group more effective
than as individual.
Starting out you don’t have the experience from the
hard way. There’s only so much experience you can
pass on, the rest you have to learn from yourself. I
may be able to do it and get away with it, but what
you don’t know is almost more dangerous. Knowing
that you don’t know is more dangerous than not
knowing what you don’t know, until you learn the
hard way.
Sometimes you need to make decisions that are
illegal to save you. That happens a lot in pt. 135. I
think any pilot would choose that. Sometimes legal
doesn’t mean safe.
It’s the ultimate barometer, if a guy has been flying
in these environments for years and he’s still alive
he’s doing something right. Then there’s guys
pushing it, pushing it, pushing it and it’s going to
catch up.
I think it’s important that they fly. The less that
happens the more people lose touch with day-to-day
ops. It keeps them involved and out with crews.
They can see problems and trends.
Initially there wasn’t much oversight by the FAA, it
was the wild west. As long as you brought the plane
back it was on you. That freedom is good but it’s a
Catch-22 with what people choose to do with it.

146

Researcher’s
code
Ego

External reviewer’s
code
Machoism,
confidence

Cockpit
relationships
(CRM)
Lack of
services

CRM

Resources

Camaraderie

Community

AK
experience

Unique experience
required, unique
challenges

Legality

Rule-bending, culture

Risk-tolerance

Limit-pushing,
staying within
abilities

Management

Organizational
behavior

Oversight

Freedom/cowboy
operations

APPENDIX E
Safety Recommendations
Promech Previous Safety Recommendations
A-08-59

A-08-60

A-08-61

A-08-62

A-16-36

A-1312/13

Install and maintain weather cameras
at critical areas of air tour routes
within the Misty Fjords National
Monument and other scenic areas in
Southeast Alaska that are frequently
traveled by air tour operators.
Develop a permanent mechanism to
provide en route and ground-based
observations of air tour flights in
Southeast Alaska at least once a
month during the tour season to ensure
operators are adhering to safe flying
practices.
Develop a cue-based training program
for commercial air tour pilots in
Southeast Alaska that specifically
addresses hazardous aspects of local
weather phenomena and in-flight
decision-making.
Once a cue-based training program is
developed as requested in Safety
Recommendation A-08-61, require all
commercial air tour operators in
Southeast Alaska to provide initial and
recurrent training in these subjects to
their pilots.
Require all 14 [C.F.R.] Part 135
operators to establish [SMS]
programs.

Closedacceptable
action

FAA installed 10 weather
cameras along high
density routes in SE
Alaska.

Closedacceptable
action

En route inspections of
air tour operators added
to FAA Order 1800.56.
Inspectors conduct two
ground-based
surveillance activities per
operator per year.
FAA informed NTSB
that all commercial air
tour operators were
performing this training
as of January 4, 2012.

Require installation of flight recorder
system on all newly manufactured and
existing turbine powered aircraft
under part 91, 121, 135 aircraft. The
crash-resistant recorders system
should record audio and images to
include as much of the cockpit and
outside as possible.

Openunacceptable
response
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Closedacceptable
action

Closedacceptable
alternate
action

As of summer 2011, all
area tour operators had
implemented training.
FAA assurance of
continued monitoring.

Openacceptable
response

SMS not currently
required for Pt 135
operators. Program is
voluntary. FAA
investigating value of
SMS programs for 135
operators.
The FAA has responded
to previous NTSB safety
recommendations
requiring crash-resistant
flight recorder systems.
They explain that 1) the
rulemaking environment
needs to have a positive

A-96-95

Develop a controlled-flight-intoterrain training program that includes
realistic simulator exercises
comparable to the successful wind
shear and rejected takeoff training
programs and make training in such a
program mandatory for all pilots
operating under 14 C.F.R. Part 121.

Closedacceptable
alternate
action

cost-benefit to society, 2)
the FAA could not find a
positive quantitative costbenefit, and 3) data
would be used for risk
identification and
remedial actions among
others.
FAA and Boeing
developed a CFIT
training aid for all 121
and 135 operators for
inclusion in their training
programs. The FAA
issued a change to
include a CRM scenario
that involved CFIT in
training sessions. A
separate change required
training on all
procedures, techniques,
and equipment used by
the operator, to include
TAWS systems.

Promech Post-Accident Safety Recommendations
A-17-35

A-17-36

Implement ways to provide effective
terrain awareness and warning system
(TAWS) protections while mitigating
nuisance alerts for single-engine
airplanes operated under 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 135 that
frequently operate at
altitudes below their respective TAWS
class design alerting threshold.
Discuss at the next Ketchikan Air
Safety meeting the database and
software considerations for Legacy
Chelton systems and encourage
operators to use the most current terrain
database and electronic flight
instrument system software.
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Openacceptable
response

General Aviation Joint
Steering Committee has
created group to
examine CFIT accidents.
A special committee has
been tasked with
developing TAWSbased solutions.

Closedacceptable
action

Discussed updated
terrain databases at the
relevant safety meetings.
Plan to continue to
provide operator
oversight to ensure
systems are used in
accordance with
operator manuals and
training programs.

A-17-37

A-17-38

A-17-39

Work with members of the Ketchikan
air tour industry to improve existing
training programs aimed at reducing
the risk of weather-related accidents
including (1) the need to help pilots
better calibrate what constitutes safe
weather conditions to conduct flights
based on objective standards and
requirements, such as set criteria for
what landmarks must be clearly visible
from which locations in order to
proceed on a particular route; (2) the
need to help pilots who are new to the
area recognize dynamic local weather
patterns that can place them in a
dangerous situation; and (3) operational
influences on pilot decision-making.
Expand the application of Federal
Aviation Administration Order 8900.1,
volume 3, chapter 19, section 6,
“Safety Assurance System: Flight
Training Curriculum Segments,”
paragraphs 3-1251(B) and 3-1252,
which address controlled flight into
terrain-avoidance training programs for
14 Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) Part 135 helicopter operations,
to all 14 C.F.R. Part 135 operations.

Openunacceptable
response

Resources listed for
training programs
included the Medallion
Shield Program which
has been defunct since
2019. Other actions
described do not
specifically address
Safety
Recommendations.
CFIT training is not a
regulatory requirement,
and not subject to FAA
oversight.

Openunacceptable
response

Establish minimum initial and recurrent
training requirements for personnel
authorized to exercise operational
control, including, but not limited to,
approved subject knowledge areas,
training hours, subject hours, and
qualification modules.

Openunacceptable
response

The first response to this
recommendation implied
FAA research into the
effectiveness of these
programs for fixed-wing
operators. A response
was expected within 3–5
years following the
recommendation;
however, no additional
update has been
received.
The first response to this
recommendation implied
FAA research into the
effectiveness of these
programs for operators
and rule-making
capability. A response
was expected within 3–5
years following the
recommendation;
however, no additional
update has been
received.
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A-17-40

A-17-41

A-17-42

Publish an advisory circular that
provides guidance on operational
control best practices, including, but
not limited to, such areas as risk
mitigation strategies, joint flight safety
responsibilities, prior experience of
operational control personnel, and
operational control personnel duty time
limitations.
Revise Federal Aviation
Administration Order 8900.1 to include
guidance for inspector oversight of
operational control training program
subject areas, including, but not limited
to, the criteria for a qualification
module.

Analyze automatic dependent
surveillance-broadcast data from
Ketchikan air tour operations on an
ongoing basis and meet annually with
Ketchikan air tour operators to engage
in a nonpunitive discussion of any
operational hazards reflected in the data
and collaborate on mitigation strategies
for any hazards identified.
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Openacceptable
response

Openunacceptable
response

Openunacceptable
response

Advisory Circular has
been drafted, following
input from local area
operators, the draft will
be published in
September 2021

The first response to this
recommendation implied
FAA research into the
effectiveness of these
programs for operators
and rule-making
capability. A response
was expected within 3–5
years following the
recommendation;
however, no additional
update has been
received.
The FSDO Juneau office
meets with area
operators to discuss
safety related items.
ADS-B was reported to
be one of the topics at
the meetings. However,
NTSB staff at the
meetings do not recall
any discussion on ADSB data. We have not
received any additional
information regarding
this safety
recommendation.

A-17-43

Develop and implement special
operating rules for the Ketchikan air
tour industry that include en route
visual flight rules weather minimums
that are tailored to the industry’s
unique requirements and are more
conservative than those specified in 14
Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

Openunacceptable
response

A-17-44

CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION: Encourage your
members that sell air tours as shore
excursions to review the circumstances
of this accident and to consider ways to
mitigate associated risks.

Closedacceptable
action

The first response to this
recommendation implied
FAA research into the
effectiveness of these
programs for operators
and rule-making
capability. A response
was expected within 3–5
years following the
recommendation;
however, no additional
update has been
received.
Cruise Lines
International
Association distributed
copies of the accident
report to its members
and encouraged a review
of circumstances leading
to the accident and ways
to mitigate them.

Togiak Safety Recommendations
A-18013

Although CFIT training programs are
not required by the FAA, work with
operators to improve any voluntary
implemented training programs aimed at
reducing the risk of CFIT accidents
involving VFR into IMC. This includes
the challenges flying in mountainous
terrain in AK and low-altitude VFR
flight in areas subject to rapid changes
in weather, and limitations of the Alaska
infrastructure (weather,
communications, etc.).
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Openacceptable
response

The FAA is working with
the General Aviation Joint
Steering Committee
(GAJSC) on the CFIT
workgroup to improve
training programs to
reduce the risk of CFIT.

A-18014

Work with Part 135 certificate holders
that operate under VFR regarding the
aircraft’s required TAWS systems to
ensure management and pilots are aware
of the risks associated with distraction
and complacency, develop plans for
mitigating those risks, and develop
procedures that specifically the use of
the TAWS inhibit switches.

Openacceptable
response

A-18015

Modify the TAWS requirements so that
once alerts are manually inhibited, they
do not remain inhibited indefinitely if
the pilot does not uninhibit them.

Openacceptable
response

A-18016

Install communications equipment
throughout Alaska to allow increased
access to the IFR system.

Openawait
response

A-18017

Ensure that Alaska airports served by
Part 135 operators have instrument
approaches and weather-reporting
capabilities to enable IFR operations.

Openawait
response

A-18018

Expand criteria for Medallion Shield
program to include materials in
operators FAA training programs and
manuals.

Closed-no
longer
applicable
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The FAA is developing a
safety alert for operators
that will discuss the risks
associated with nuisance
alerts, encourage
operators to ensure all
pilots are aware of the
risks associated with
routinely using the terrain
inhibit feature, and
recommend implementing
policies and procedures
into their training
programs.
The FAA and GAJSC are
issuing recommendations
to reduce CFIT accidents.
A special committee has
been tasked with
developing TAWS-based
solutions.
The FAA is identifying
new requirements for
prioritization. Alaska
requirements compete for
funding. 33 requirements
exist in Alaska, four of
which have received
funding. The FAA is
currently installing the
four facilities.
The FAA in conjunction
with the AK DOT plans
to use funds to install
AWOS systems. The AK
DOT has identified eight
airport AWOS locations
which will be installed
using funding from 2020
grants and installed in
2021.
The Medallion
Foundation ceased
operations on 15
September 2019.

A-18019

A-18020

To Medallion Foundation: Expand
criteria for safety star to include
requirements for a flight data
monitoring program.
To Hageland Aviation: Incorporate into
your CRM training program ground,
simulator, and flight training that define
SIC responsibilities. This includes SOPs
and PF/PM duties, aeronautical
decision-making and judgment
scenarios tailored to Hageland’s flight
operations and aviation environment.

Closed-no
longer
applicable
Openacceptable
response

The Medallion
Foundation ceased
operations on 15
September 2019.
A new Cessna 208 flight
standards manual was
created that addresses two
pilot crews. Hageland is
in the process of revision
their operations training
manual which will
address initial and
recurrent training. Their
operational control agents
were required to obtain
Part 65 aircraft dispatcher
certificates. Following the
review of the updated
operations training
manual, this
recommendation will be
classified as closed.

Ketchikan Midair Collision Safety Recommendations
d
A-21TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Identify high015
traffic air tour areas and require, through a special federal aviation
regulation or other means, that Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
Parts 91 and 135 air tour operators that operate within those areas be
equipped with an Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Outand In-supported traffic advisory system that 1) includes both visual
and aural alerts, 2) is driven by an algorithm designed to minimize
nuisance alerts, and 3) is operational during all flight operations.

Openawait
response

A-21016

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: In the hightraffic air tour areas identified in Safety Recommendation A-21-15,
require that all non–air tour aircraft operating within the airspace be
equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out.

Openawait
response

A-21017

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Require the
installation of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Out- and
In-supported airborne traffic advisory systems that include aural and
visual alerting functions in all aircraft conducting operations under
Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

Openawait
response
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A-21018

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Review
current and future supplemental type certificate installation instructions
and flight manual supplements to ensure they provide provisions to
prevent the inadvertent disabling of the broadcast of pressure altitude
data, by design, where practicable.

Openawait
response

A-21019

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Ensure that
checklists for all Capstone Program (Phase 2) aircraft include
verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head selector knob is in the
ON position and that the unit is in ALT Mode before takeoff.

Openawait
response

A-21020

TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION: Update the
Aeronautical Information Manual and the Pilot’s Handbook of
Aeronautical Knowledge to include the limitations inherent in visual
scans for traffic and the benefits and best practices of using cockpit
displays of traffic information to supplement visual scans to help
overcome these limitations.
TO FOREFLIGHT: Update your traffic alerting algorithms so that
traffic targets for which there is no altitude information are assumed to
be at the same altitude as the ownship (that is, the aircraft receiving the
target data).
TO TAQUAN AIR: Revise the checklists for your fleet of aircraft to
ensure they include verification that the Garmin GSL 71 control head
selector knob is in the ON position and that the unit is in ALT Mode
before takeoff.
TO AVIATION INDUSTRY GROUPS (AIRCRAFT OWNERS AND
PILOTS ASSOCIATION, EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION
ASSOCIATION, TOUR OPERATORS PROGRAM OF SAFETY,
TONGASS AIRCRAFT PILOTS ASSOCIATION, AND
HELICOPTER ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL): Inform your
members about the circumstances of this accident and encourage them
to take the following actions: (1) become familiar with the traffic
display equipment installed in their aircraft; (2) if their equipment does
not provide an aural alert concerning proximate targets that might pose
a collision threat, encourage pilots/operators to supplement the
equipment with devices that provide both an aural and visual alert; and
(3) remind pilots to include the traffic display when scanning for traffic
through the aircraft’s windows.

Openawait
response

A-21021

A-21022

A-21023
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Openawait
response
Openawait
response
Openawait
response

A-21024

TO THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS
AND THE SOCIETY OF AVIATION AND FLIGHT EDUCATORS:
Inform your members of the circumstances of this accident and
incorporate instruction on including the traffic display when scanning
for traffic through an aircraft’s windows in both initial and recurrent
pilot training.

155

Openawait
response
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